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Lawyers and judges speak to each other in a language of precedents—decisions
from cases that have come before. The most persuasive precedent to cite, of course, is
an on-point decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. But Supreme Court opinions are
changing. They contain more factual claims about the world than ever before, and
those claims are now rich with empirical data. This Supreme Court factfinding is
also highly accessible; fast digital research leads directly to factual language in old
cases that is perfect for arguments in new ones. An unacknowledged consequence of
all this is the rise of what I call “factual precedents”: the tendency of lower courts to
cite Supreme Court cases as authorities on factual subjects, as evidence that the
factual claims are indeed true. Rather than citing, for example, evidence from the
record to establish that carpal tunnel syndrome regularly resolves without surgery,
lower courts instead cite language from a Supreme Court opinion for that point.
This Article carefully describes how lower courts are using Supreme Court facts
today and then argues that these factual precedents are unwise. The Supreme Court
is not a factfinding institution. Facts change over time. And, unlike legal precedents,
one cannot be certain that factual statements from the Supreme Court are carefully
deliberated and carry the force of law. I argue that Supreme Court statements of
fact should not receive any authoritative force separate from the force that attaches
to whatever legal conclusions they contributed to originally. If a fact is so central to
the legal holding that the two meld together, then the Supreme Court is free to so
state and thus insulate the factual conclusion from future challenges by making it
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part of the legal rule. But the presumption, I suggest, should be no precedential
value for generalized factual claims—even if they are facts found in the U.S.
Reports.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and judges speak to each other in a language of precedents—
decisions from cases that have come before.1 The most persuasive precedent
to cite—either to a judge in argument or from a judge in explanation—is an
on-point decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Because lower courts in our
legal system treat decisions of higher courts with supervisory jurisdiction as

1 See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1934-35 (2008)
(“[L]aw is, at bottom, an authoritative practice . . . . [T]he law’s practice of using and announcing its authorities . . . is part and parcel of law’s character.”).
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binding authority, a precedent from the very highest court effectively takes
the issue off the table in the lower court.2 Supreme Court precedents,
therefore, are extremely valuable to all litigants and judges across the
country.
But Supreme Court opinions are changing. They are longer.3 They
spawn more concurrences and dissents.4 They include more citations than
ever before.5 And the citations are changing too. The Justices are not just
citing cases. The Supreme Court is in the “throes of a widespread empirical
turn”6; consequently, its opinions are chock-full of statistics, social science
studies, and other general statements of fact about the world.7
2 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 128
(1997) (noting that, because of “[p]rinciples of stare decisis,” once a “question is decided in an
appellate court, . . . lower courts are then responsible for following that decision”); see also
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 433, 479 (2012) (“Supreme Court holdings are strictly binding on the lower
courts.”).
3 See Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme
Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 646 (2008) (documenting the increase in opinion length
over time).
4 See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI.
362, 375-76 (2001) (analyzing the increase in dissenting opinions over time and providing
empirical evidence for the argument that judges no longer hide their private disagreements from
the public as judges in the nineteenth century did); Linda Greenhouse, The High Court and the
Triumph of Discord, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at WK1 (describing the culture of dissent that has
become entrenched within the Supreme Court over time).
5 See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their Use
and Significance, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 489, 531-37 (noting that the increase in citations over time
may be the natural result of various factors, including the larger number of cases to cite, the
existence of digital databases like LexisNexis and Westlaw, which facilitate the finding of citations,
and the increased use of law clerks who seem eager to use citations).
6 Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and Constitutional Truths,
82 N.C. L. REV. 115, 118 (2003); see also Tracy L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in
Criminal Law and Procedure—And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 853 (explaining that,
over the past decade, judges and lawyers have begun to cite to empirical studies in their work with
increasing regularity); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial
Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 658-68 (1988) (providing a historical
account of the use of facts in judicial opinions and noting that “[o]nce heretical, the belief that
empirical studies can influence the content of legal doctrine is now one of the few points of
general agreement among jurists” (quoting John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority:
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477 (1986)));
cf. Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 912 (2011) (observing how the digital revolution has “blurr[ed] . . .
the line between legal and nonlegal authority” in recent judicial opinions).
7 I have previously considered how Supreme Court Justices inform themselves about these
factual questions. See Allison O. Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV.
1255, 1286-90 (2012). That article discussed the upstream flow of factual information at the
Supreme Court—where the authorities come from. This Article discusses the downstream—what
happens in the lower courts after the factual statements become enshrined in the U.S. Reports.
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As Supreme Court opinions are fattening up, legal research methods
have also changed. Full text searching enables a new emphasis on quotes
over holdings and “words over concepts.”8 Gone are the days of hunting for
principles of law in a digest or Shepardizing a case for ones with similar
facts.9 The new digital mode of legal research often leads directly to language
in a decided case that is perfect for an argument in a new one—regardless of
whether the language was central to the case in which it was offered or
whether the holding of the cited case has any relevance to the one at hand.
As Fred Schauer put it years ago, “[I]t is not what the Supreme Court held
that matters, but what it said. In interpretive arenas below the Supreme
Court, one good quote is worth a hundred clever analyses of the holding.”10
An unacknowledged consequence of all this is the rise of what I call “factual precedents”: the tendency of lower courts to over-rely on Supreme
Court opinions and to apply generalized statements of fact from old cases to
new ones.11 Rather than citing, for example, evidence from the record to
establish that many mild cases of carpal tunnel syndrome resolve without
surgery, lower courts instead cite language from a Supreme Court opinion
for that point.12

8 Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 219,
245-48 (2010).
9 See Katrina Fischer Kuh, Electronically Manufactured Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 223, 24344 (2008) (explaining that, unlike the paradigmatic electronic research process, the “print-only
world was largely controlled by case digests and indices,” in which the researcher played an “active
role in making matches between the research question and the topics and key numbers”).
10 Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986).
11 A handful of others have observed the confusion surrounding the precedential value of
factual claims. See, e.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY
OF CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 141-58 (2008) (addressing whether lower courts can “revisit
precedent so as to adjust earlier rulings to account for a changed factual landscape”); Stuart M.
Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78
TEX. L. REV. 269, 369-71 (1999) (discussing implications for reviewing courts when facts of a case
change); Caitlin E. Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1185, 1236-37 (2013) (discussing that a “common area of confusion that arises when
courts address issues of constitutional social fact is a blurring between normative judgments and
empirical fact”); Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 970 (1955) (discussing
courts’ tendency to apply stare decisis to findings of fact); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth:
Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 DUKE L.J. 1, 64 (2011) (“Whatever the law might
require, lower courts will, as a practical matter, often reflexively follow a statement by a higher
court, even if the statement is only dictum or a factual finding that perhaps ought not be
binding.”).
12 See, e.g., Heimann v. Roadway Express, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 886, 904 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(citing Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199 (2002), for
the proposition that “one quarter of the carpal tunnel cases resolve within one month without
surgical intervention”).
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To be sure, factual claims play different roles at the Court. Sometimes
the Court’s understanding of a generalized fact leads it to adopt one legal
rule over another. The holding in Brown v. Board of Education relied on the
factual assertion that African American children are psychologically harmed
by segregated schools.13 The holding in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission relied on the factual claim that corporate independent expenditures do not corrupt politics.14 Whether legal holdings should rely on factual
claims and how vulnerable those decisions are for reversal is a debate for
another day. This Article tackles a different question: Namely, should the
Court’s statements of fact ever receive separate precedential force, distinct
from the precedential force of whatever legal conclusions they contributed
to originally?
In this Article, I argue no. The traditional arguments favoring strong
stare decisis do not apply to statements of fact. The Supreme Court is not a
factfinding institution. Facts change over time. And, most troubling, factual
authorities employed instrumentally by the Justices—for persuasive rhetoric—may not be carefully deliberated, may not have garnered the support of
five Justices, and may be selected for reasons other than that they are the
most reliable sources. At bottom, the fear is that lower court judges will take
something as authoritative from one who is not an authority on the subject.
Factual statements about the way the world works should not be entrenched
for the whole country in this way.
A concrete example might help. In 2009, in Nken v. Holder, the Supreme
Court ruled on the legal standard to apply when a noncitizen sought to stay
his deportation pending judicial review of his appeal.15 At the end of the
opinion, Chief Justice Roberts opined that deportation did not result in
irreparable injury.16 He added, “Aliens who are removed may continue to
pursue their petitions for review, and those who prevail can be afforded
effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with restoration of the
immigration status they had upon removal.”17 This statement has a factual
component—a true or false assertion about prevalent immigration practices—
that was based on assurances from the Solicitor General in his brief that the
United States tries to facilitate the return of deported immigrants who later
win their appeals.

13
14
15
16
17

347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954).
558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
556 U.S. 418, 433-46 (2009).
Id. at 435.
Id.
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After inquiries from immigration attorneys, the Solicitor General admitted
in a letter to the Supreme Court that he is “not confident” that U.S. policy
is as clear as described in the Nken brief.18 Immigration rights groups are
not satisfied by this letter, however.19 Interestingly, they do not seek a
rehearing of the Nken case—perhaps acknowledging that the factual mistake
would not cause the Court to alter the result. What they are worried about,
instead, is that other courts will rely on this statement of fact in Nken to the
detriment of noncitizens in other cases.20 They are, in other words, worried
about the factual precedent coming out of Nken. And they have reason to
worry: at least ten courts to date (federal and state) have quoted the above
statement from the Chief Justice about the general tendencies of immigration officials.21
Nken is not an outlier. Lower courts cite the Supreme Court to establish,
for example, that forensic evidence is frequently manipulated,22 postabortion depression is exaggerated,23 Americans attend church more often
than citizens of other nations,24 predatory pricing rarely occurs in the

18 See Jess Bravin, Correct the Record, Rights Groups Say After DoJ Admits Mistake, WALL ST. J.
L. BLOG (May 4, 2012), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/05/04/correct-the-record-rights-groupssay-after-doj-admits-mistake (noting that the Solicitor General’s office admitted that it “mistakenly stated that it routinely ‘facilitates’ the return to the U.S. of deported immigrants who later win
their appeals”).
19 Id.
20 Id.; see also Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and
the Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600, 1602 (2013) (manuscript at
103) (complaining that “the damage was done . . . lower courts had already revised caselaw about
stays in light of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement”).
21 See, e.g., Juarez-Chavez v. Holder, 515 F. App’x 463, 467 (6th Cir. 2013); Luna v. Holder,
637 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2011); Spence v. Holder, 414 F. App’x 637, 639 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011);
Lezama-Garcia v. Holder, 666 F.3d 518, 537-38 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Adame-Orozco,
607 F.3d 647, 655 n.10 (10th Cir. 2010); Rodriguez-Barajas v. Holder, 624 F.3d 678, 681 n.3 (5th
Cir. 2010); Jimenez v. Napolitano, No. 12-3558, 2012 WL 3144026, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012);
Nat’l Immigration Project of Nat’l Lawyers Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 868 F. Supp.
2d 284, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Désiré v. Holder, No. 08-1329, 2009 WL 4898261, at *2 (D. Ariz.
Dec. 14, 2009); Villajin v. Mukasey, No. 08-0839, 2009 WL 1459210, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 26,
2009).
22 See, e.g., Matthies v. State, 85 So. 3d 838, 845 (Miss. 2012) (citing Melandez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009)).
23 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 750 (8th Cir.
2008) (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
24 See, e.g., Card v. City of Everett, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1173 n.2 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (citing
McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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market,25 campaign donations lead to biased judges,26 and psychopaths
retain some ability to control their behavior.27
Lower courts seem confused about what to do with these Supreme
Court findings of fact.28 Some courts deny being bound by the factual
findings of higher courts.29 Others say it makes no sense to reproduce all of
the factual evidence—on abortion procedures or effects of campaign finance
laws, for example—in every relevant case.30 What is clear, however, is that
despite what they say about the limits of stare decisis, “the tendency of the
courts to apply that principle to findings of fact is a rather substantial
one.”31 This particularly holds true for statements of fact that come from the

25 See, e.g., McGuire Oil Co. v. Mapco Petroleum, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (S.D. Ala.
1991) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)), rev’d sub
nom., McGuire Oil Co. v. Pampco. Inc., 986 F.2d 444 (11th Cir. 1993).
26 See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 839 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Republican Party of
Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789-90 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring)), rev’d, 674 F.3d 1010
(8th Cir. 2012).
27 People v. Williams, 74 P.3d 779, 782 (Cal. 2003) (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412
(2002)).
28 See Davis, supra note 11 (discussing courts’ tendency to apply stare decisis to findings of
fact); Gorod, supra note 11 (explaining that lower courts “often reflexively follow a statement by a
higher court, even if the statement is only dictum or a factual finding that perhaps ought not be
binding”); see also FAIGMAN, supra note 11, at 114 (“The [Supreme] Court has no overriding theory
of when it should be deferential to other bodies—judicial and nonjudicial—that have made
findings of constitutional fact.”).
29 See, e.g., A Woman’s Choice–E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th
Cir. 2002) (“Th[e] admixture of fact and law, sometimes called an issue of ‘constitutional fact,’ is
reviewed without deference in order to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from
having far-reaching legal effects.”).
30 See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“Carhart established the health exception requirement as a per se constitutional rule. This rule is
based on substantial medical authority (from a broad array of sources) recognized by the Supreme
Court, and this body of medical authority does not have to be reproduced in every subsequent
challenge to a ‘partial birth abortion’ statute lacking a health exception.”), vacated sub nom.
Herring v. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women, 550 U.S. 901 (2007); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d
857, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting) (“[T]he health effects of ‘partial birth’ abortion . . . should indeed be treated as a legislative fact, rather than an adjudicative fact, in order to
avoid inconsistent results arising from the reactions of different district judges . . . to different
records . . . .”), vacated sub nom. Christensen v. Doyle, 530 U.S. 1271 (2000); see also Long Beach
Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Supreme
Court precedent forecloses the City’s argument that independent expenditures by independent
expenditure committees (‘IECs’), like the Chamber PACs, raise the specter of corruption or the
appearance thereof.”); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 (D.D.C.) (“To
the extent the FEC argues that large contributions to the national parties are corrupting and can
be limited because they create gratitude, facilitate access, or generate influence, Citizens United
makes clear that those theories are not viable.”), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3544 (2010).
31 Davis, supra note 11.

66

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 59

Supreme Court—regardless of how central the fact was to the legal rule
announced in the original case.32
This Article highlights this growing problem and offers one possible
solution to the confusion. I argue that lower courts should never give
separate precedential force to Supreme Court findings of fact. These
generalized factual claims should not even be treated as extra persuasive
because they appear in the U.S. Reports. A lower court should not care
what Justice O’Connor says about carpal tunnel syndrome or what Justices
Kennedy or Ginsburg say about post-abortion depression. There should not,
in other words, be precedential force for any factual statement by the
Supreme Court distinct from the force attached to the legal holding it
helped to create. The creeping temptation in the lower courts to answer
factual questions by relying on decisions from the Supreme Court is one
that should be resisted.
Accepting my position is most difficult in cases when it seems the Supreme
Court is trying to assert its authority on a factual matter and to settle a
debate for the country. For example, take the campaign finance finding in
Citizens United33 that corporate independent expenditures do not corrupt
the political process, and the affirmative action fact found in Grutter v.
Bollinger34 that exposure to racially diverse viewpoints is critical to a good
law school education. Are these facts open for debate in subsequent litigation in the lower courts?
On this final question, I offer some intentionally preliminary answers. I
certainly do not endorse a factual free-for-all in the lower courts. But there
are ways for the Supreme Court to control the precedential treatment of its
decisions without creating factual precedents. If the Court wants to make
something unreviewable by lower courts, it can clearly articulate that any
factual claim it endorses is just part of the legal rule. If it does not do that,
however, then the factual question should remain open; the presumption
should be against precedential value for factual findings.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part One defines factual precedents,
and Part Two describes in detail how lower courts are using Supreme Court
statements of fact as authoritative. Part Three then asserts that factual
precedents are unwise and argues against their use. Part Four concludes by
suggesting that some high-profile Supreme Court factual findings are not
32 As one district court noted candidly, “‘[B]y the way’ statements made by the Supreme
Court resonate more forcefully than dicta from other sources.” United States v. Miller, 604 F.
Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).
33 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
34 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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actually facts but instead are just generalizations that form components of
legal rules. This Article calls for lower courts to resist overusing factual
statements in Supreme Court opinions and for the Supreme Court to be
more precise with its factual labels.
I. WHAT ARE FACTUAL PRECEDENTS?
A. Law Versus Fact
The first order of business in defining a factual precedent is to be clear
about what constitutes a fact. It is true that the line distinguishing law from
fact starts to dissolve if one thinks too deeply about it. Many statements
that seem to be pure legal propositions can actually be repackaged as
statements of fact without much effort. For example, “separate but equal is
not equal” can be restated as “separate schools psychologically harm minority children.”35 And naked statements of normative preferences or value
judgments, such as “abortion is hard on women,” can also easily look like
factual assertions once they are followed by a citation with supporting
empirical research.
Indeed, differentiating law from fact has spawned a healthy debate about
whether there is even a difference between the two concepts. Some, like
Ronald Allen, Michael Pardo, and Gary Lawson, claim that the law–fact
distinction is a myth and “the quest to find ‘the’ essential difference between
the two . . . is doomed from the start.”36 These scholars argue that socalled issues of fact and law involve both arguing from evidence “and the
35 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact
Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1961 (2006) (noting that Brown v. Board of Education
turned on “‘modern authority’ regarding race discrimination’s harmful effects on educational
opportunities”). Goldberg states that similar factual assertions were critical in sex equality cases in
the 1970s and in gay rights cases today. Id. at 1966. For example, she notes the judicial reliance on
the “fact” that women lacked the capacity for prolonged labor or the “fact” that children fare better
in the homes of heterosexual couples. Id. at 1967-68.
36 Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the Law–Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 1769, 1770 (2003); see also Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial
Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1172-77 (2001) (challenging the distinction
between law and fact in the context of judicial decisions to defer to Congress); Gary Lawson,
Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 863 (1992) (“[T]he law–fact distinction, whatever its
utility, is purely a creature of convention.”); John O. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging
Facts Like Law, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 69, 71 (2008) (“There is no analytic dichotomy between
law and fact. Law is a social fact, just as are the data or statistical analysis that may be relevant to
questions such as whether partial abortions are ever medically necessary.”); Saul M. Pilchen,
Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding
Under the Post Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337, 379-80 (1984) (calling the
line between law and fact a “slippery” one).
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attempt to reconstruct some segment of reality.”37 The only meaningful
difference between the two, they say, is a functional one about allocating
authority (between judge and jury, trial court and reviewing court, and the
like).38
Other scholars, however, like Henry Monaghan and Richard Friedman,
argue that law and fact are distinct, real, and separate categories. Monaghan
concedes that the concepts are not “static, polar opposites. Rather, law and
fact have a nodal quality; they are points of rest and relative stability on a
continuum of experience.”39 Likewise, Friedman argues that while the line
between law and fact is not always easy to draw, it is more than just convention. He claims that “ordinary factual issues relate to constructing some
aspect of reality; whereas, the legal issues relate to prescribing the norms
that apply and consequences that attach to that constructed reality.”40
Thankfully this is not a debate that needs to be resolved today. Instead,
it is enough for present purposes to note two uncontroverted truths.
First, wrestling with the distinction between law and fact is a task we ask
courts and administrative agencies to master all the time.41 Even those
scholars who decry that there is no analytical distinction between law and
fact admit the central importance of the labels in our legal system.42 Identifying an issue as a factual one matters in terms of whether an issue goes to
the jury, whether a reviewing court defers to a lower court, and whether a
precedent is ripe for reversal.43
37
38

Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1792-93.
See Lawson, supra note 36, at 862-63 (explaining that one reason for the enduring character
of the law–fact distinction is that “it provides a serviceable, if not indispensable, tool for allocating
decisionmaking authority in a complex, lawyered legal system”).
39 Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 233 (1985).
40 Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1801 (citing Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion
and the Distinction Between Fact and Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 917-19 (1992)).
41 Goldberg, supra note 35, at 1964 (describing “fact-based adjudication” and noting that
“courts focus on facts alone when evaluating restrictions on social groups,” like minorities in race,
gender, or sexual orientation, even if these facts contain normative judgments).
42 Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1778 (noting how the law–fact distinction “appears in the
Constitution” and influences judicial “decision-making authority”).
43 The Supreme Court’s most famous discussion of stare decisis—Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylyvania v. Casey—announced that it is appropriate to overrule a prior decision
when the facts or our “understanding of the facts” have changed. 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992).
Moreover, standards of review of administrative agencies turn on whether the question at hand is
a legal one or a factual one. Compare Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951)
(setting a standard of review for factual findings of administrative agencies), with Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984) (setting a standard of review for
agency legal interpretations). For other examples of significant consequences that attach to the
law–fact distinction, see Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1778.
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Second, rightly or wrongly, most lawyers and judges have confidence in
their ability to distinguish law from fact. This confidence likely comes from
the pedigree of the distinction and its centrality in the practice of law.44
Putting aside the robust academic debate about defining facts, therefore, the
reality is that we often intuitively identify factual claims—we know them
when we see them. As Fred Schauer and Virginia Wise once explained, “All
distinctions potentially have borderline cases, . . . [a]nd although lawyers,
particularly, are likely to be preoccupied with dusk when people ask them
about the distinction between night and day,” the distinction is still worth
making in the first instance.45 Put differently, I acknowledge the possibility
that there may be no clear analytic distinction between law and fact. But
due to the practical importance of the line and its entrenched place in our
legal system, it is necessary to discuss what leads most of us to label certain
statements as facts and other statements as law.46
To borrow insight from scientists, factual claims are ones that can be
falsified (at least theoretically).47 “The hallmark of scientific statements is
that they are vulnerable to refutation.”48 As David Faigman helpfully
explains, “One example of a falsifiable statement would be the view that
criminal penalties operate to deter criminal conduct. As a logical matter,
44 See Allen & Pardo, supra note 36, at 1778 (attributing the “pedigree and usefulness” of the
law–fact distinction to the fact that it “appears in the Constitution and has traditionally helped to
allocate decision-making authority”).
45 Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 498 (2000).
46 See Pilchen, supra note 36 (noting that the distinction between law and fact is “slippery,”
but observing that the line seems simple “[u]nder a commonsense analysis”).
47 At the risk of oversimplifying the very complicated philosophy of science, it is a wellestablished, even if not universally accepted, idea in this field that “[f]alsifiability is a criterion for
demarcating science . . . . A statement is falsifiable, and hence scientific, only if it is incompatible with some basic statement, i.e., a statement reporting the occurrence of an observable event at
a specified place and time.” Susan Haack, Federal Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction—And a
Reconstruction, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 394, 401 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 401
nn.25-27 (describing the philosophy of the late Karl Popper who spent his career attempting to
distinguish scientific statements from nonscientific ones using falsifiability).
Even Karl Popper conceded that neither falsifiability “nor any other criterion []can distinguish science from pseudo-science on the basis of formal logic alone.” Adina Schwartz, A “Dogma
of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Need to Resurrect the
Philosophical Insight of Frye v. United States, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 176 (1997). F0r
information on Popper, see Karl Popper, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Stephen
Thornton ed., 2009). But although it may not be perfect, I am not the first legal scholar to have
borrowed falsifiability as a criterion to distinguish fact from law. See David L. Faigman, To Have
and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J.
1005, 1017 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV.
145, 150 (“I rely on the basic scientific definition of facts as (at least in theory) falsifiable.”).
48 Faigman, supra note 47, at 1017.

70

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 59

this statement is potentially falsifiable by a variety of observations inconsistent with the stated relationship.”49 By contrast, the normative belief in
the retributive value of punishment is not one that can be proven true or
false.50 It is not, in other words, a claim of fact.
To be sure, a legal ruling can also be refuted. It can be an awkward understanding of words or an unfaithful application of precedent. But a factual
claim is potentially wrong in a different way. A factual claim can be tested
“with a degree of detached certainty.”51 It is theoretically accurate or inaccurate. When a Supreme Court Justice states that a child’s brain development
can be altered by violent video games, that claim is subsequently critiqued
by neuroscientists as either true or false—either supported by the evidence
or not.52 Scientists would not critique the claim as illogical, unprecedented,
or bad policy—those arguments are instead for lawyers to mount at legal
conclusions.
Relatedly, factual statements call out for evidence.53 In a casual debate
with a friend, for example, a factual assertion is often followed by “look it
up” (or, more likely, “Google it”), whereas a normative assertion or a
proffered legal interpretation is not. As Amy Kapczynski stated when
describing a factual inquiry, “Finding the facts involves investigation, and
the facts can be more or less certain, depending on the quality of the
evidence and the quality of the sleuthing.”54 Legal inquiries, by contrast, are
resolved by tools of the legal trade, such as analogies, logical reasoning,
common sense, and, yes, even normative judgments.55
49
50

Id.
Id. at 1016 (“The subjective belief (or disbelief ) in the retributive value of capital punishment does not implicate a fact question that is susceptible to test.”).
51 Pilchen, supra note 36, at 378.
52 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that “[e]xperimental studies in laboratories have found that subjects randomly assigned to play a
violent video game subsequently displayed more characteristics of aggression than those who
played nonviolent video games”). For a neuroscientist’s critique of Justice Breyer’s claims, see
Violent Brains in the Supreme Court, NEUROSKEPTIC ( July 15, 2011), http://neuroskeptic.blogspot.
com/2011/07/violent-brains-in-supreme-court.html.
53 See Faigman, supra note 47, at 1020 (“The testing of theories forms the battlefield of the
scientific enterprise, and it is in the trenches that science maintains its principal advantages over
common sense . . . . [S]cience subjects theories and hypotheses to systematic and constant tests,
in order to uncover the outer limits of their strengths or explanatory powers.” (footnote omitted)).
54 Amy Kapczynski, Historicism, Progress, and the Redemptive Constitution, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1041, 1066-67 (2005).
55 See Faigman, supra note 47, at 1007 (discussing how “[s]ome disciplines, those traditionally
classified as the humanities (e.g., philosophy, history, and literature), employ methods commonly
relied upon by legal analysts, such as logical reasoning, historical analysis, literary interpretation,
and common sense” (footnotes omitted)).
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To complicate matters, the facts relevant to this Article are a special
brand of fact that have come to be known as “legislative facts.”56 A legislative fact, as I have defined elsewhere and as others have discussed at length,
is a generalized fact about the world, as opposed to a “whodunit” fact
relating to the parties before a court in any one case.57 Compared to a socalled “adjudicative fact” that is case specific, a legislative fact “transcend[s]
the particular dispute” and provides descriptive information about the world
that judges use as foundational building blocks to form and apply legal
rules.58 Judicial opinions are full of these types of generalized facts such as:
partial birth abortions are never medically necessary,59 fleeing from the
police in a car leads to fatalities,60 and violent video games affect the
neurological development of a child’s brain.61
Generalized statements of fact like these are not subject to the traditional
procedural rules that govern adjudicative facts.62 Legislative facts come to
judges’ attention by way of a procedural hodgepodge: sometimes on the
record and sometimes not, sometimes briefed by the parties and sometimes
not. In fact, legislative facts are specifically exempted from the Federal Rule

56 Monaghan, supra note 39, at 230 n.16. I admit that the definition of a legislative fact is
slippery. However, “[l]ike other legal distinctions, the difference between adjudicative and
legislative facts is one of degree, and for that reason the existence of borderline cases does not
mean that the distinction is empty.” Id.
57 See Larsen, supra note 7, at 1255-56. “Legislative fact” and “adjudicative fact” are phrases
coined by Kenneth Davis. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Procedures, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942). Others have subsequently refined the
concept and created new labels, but it is the original Davis articulation upon which I rely. See
FAIGMAN, supra note 11, at 146 (proposing a “taxonomy” of “constitutional facts”); Sherry, supra
note 47 (discussing a form of legislative facts she calls “foundational facts,” which “are the
background facts that are not explicitly at issue in any particular case,” but are instead the factual
assumptions on which legal doctrine is based).
58 David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 552 (1991); see also Brenda C. See,
Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-Making Process, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 157, 191
(2004–2005) (asserting that legislative facts are relevant “where the court is in essence ‘making
law’ either by filling a gap in the common law by formulating a rule, construing a statute, or
framing a constitutional rule”).
59 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 141 (2007).
60 See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011).
61 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2768-69 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62 See Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts,
73 MINN. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) (explaining that the rules for gathering adjudicative facts are largely
ignored with respect to legislative facts). This lack of regulation has led one prominent commentator to describe the law governing legislative facts as “chaotic.” See FAIGMAN, supra note 11, at xii
(“[C]onstitutional facts come to the Court’s attention haphazardly.”).
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of Evidence on Judicial Notice—the rule most on point—and the advisory
notes actually encourage their “unfettered use.”63
This sort of fact can be dispositive to the outcome of a case, but it need
not be. As discussed further below, sometimes a judge uses a legislative fact
rhetorically to tell a story setting up the pronouncement of a legal rule or to
bolster the persuasive power of an argument. I count, for example, the
following Supreme Court statements as factual claims: police training on
constitutional rights is common across the country,64 schools in the founding generation required strict obedience,65 forensic evidence can be and is
easily manipulated,66 and immigration officials routinely try to facilitate the
return of noncitizens who win their appeals.67
By contrast, there are certain statements that the Court routinely makes
that I do not count as factual, even if they arguably deserve that label. For
example, fifty-state surveys of how the law varies across the country on any
one issue could be called factual statements, but I do not categorize them as
such because they are principally used as descriptions of the law. Additionally, questions such as “what have the courts said in the past that they would
do about situations such as this” might also be called factual, but I do not
label them as such (nor have other scholars) because “they concern the past
and prospective conduct of legal officials in determining legal norms”—a
quality absent from other factual propositions.68
For purposes of this Article, I do not consider any account about the
state of the law to be a factual claim. My working definition of a fact that
could spawn a factual precedent is any claim that can be theoretically

63
64
65

See FED. R. EVID. 201(c)–(e); see also FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note.
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006).
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 412 n.2 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The English model fostered absolute institutional control of students by faculty both inside and outside the
classroom. At all the early American schools, students lived and worked under a vast array of rules
and restrictions.”).
66 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009).
67 See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (“Aliens who are removed may continue to
pursue their petitions for review, and those who prevail can be afforded effective relief by
facilitation of their return . . . .”). One could argue that the factual claim in Nken is only a
borderline factual claim because it is just a description of how legal officials interpret the law they
implement. While acknowledging the ambiguity, the factual part of Nken to which I refer is the
claim underscored by the Solicitor General brief: that it is common for immigration officials to
facilitate the return of noncitizens who win their appeals. This claim is refutable (as illustrated
nicely by what happened after this case) by immigration statistics about what actually takes place
on the ground. For more information on the Nken story and the fallout that ensued, see generally
Morawetz, supra note 20.
68 Friedman, supra note 40, at 917.
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falsified and is followed by citation to some sort of evidence (not a case and
not a statute).69
Is the distinction between law and fact airtight? Of course not. But it
need not be. The point for now is that the distinction has a dominant role in
our legal system and there are enough shared characteristics of what most
people call “facts” to justify unique consideration of their precedential
value.
B. The Emergence of Factual Precedents
Based on this working definition of a fact, what then makes a factual
precedent? In general, precedents are legal principles established in a prior
case that are binding or persuasive authority in a subsequent case.70 In this
country, “the authority of precedent is generally thought to be one of the
most important institutional characteristics of judicial decision making.”71
A factual precedent, as I am using the phrase, refers to the citation in a
lower court opinion of a higher court’s generalized factual claim. Granted, it
is a defining feature of our common law system for judges to draw analogies
from the facts of one case to the facts of another.72 That is not the phenomenon to which I refer.
Instead, a factual precedent is a lower court’s reliance on the Supreme
Court’s assertion of legislative fact—a general factual claim—as authority to
prove that the observation is indeed true. For example, rather than just
using the work of an historian or a psychologist to establish a factual
dimension of a case (that the founding generation all owned guns for selfdefense73 or that severely mentally impaired people can still control impulses74),
69 It is certainly quite common for Supreme Court Justices to make statements of generalized fact without any accompanying supporting citations. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
(1973) (“Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future . . . . Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.”). The wisdom of this
judicial technique is worth discussing, but it is beyond the scope of this particular project. Because
I am concerned with the use of authorities in judicial decisions, and because my sense is that the
trend in the digital age is to pepper opinions with empirical data, I limit my discussion of factual
precedents to those factual claims that are accompanied by a supporting authority.
70 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214-15 (8th ed. 2004)
71 Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1150
(2002).
72 See, e.g., Brown v. Peterson, No. 03-0205, 2006 WL 349805, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 3,
2006) (comparing the symbol of a noose to the threatening history behind a burning cross as
recounted in oral arguments in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)); Kuketz v. MDC Fitness,
Corp., No. 98-1004A, 1998 WL 1119863, at *2 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Aug. 10, 1998) (comparing an
accommodation required of the Professional Golfers’ Association in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532
U.S. 661 (2001), to an accommodation in handball rules sought by a disabled handball player).
73 See People v. Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801, 810 (Sup. Ct. 2011).
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a lower court quotes relevant language from a Supreme Court decision to
make the point. A lower court relies on, in other words, the Supreme Court
(or just a single member of the Court) as an authority to settle the truth of
the fact in question.
Factual precedents probably owe their existence to any number of causes. But
two especially significant changes to the way lawyers and judges process
information deserve special mention.
1. Dramatic Changes to Legal Research
First, there has been nothing short of an absolute revolution in legal
research methods.75 Before LexisNexis and Westlaw started to offer full-text
searching (becoming popularly accessible in 1994), all legal research happened with books.76 In the old days, print-based legal research looked
something like the following:
Step one: go to the law library. Step two: find a case digest. Step three:
identify topics and legal principles relevant to your search using a key
number system. Step four: read the case summaries that correspond to the
key numbers. Step five: physically locate the case reporter and pull the
relevant cases to read.77
Everyone knows that legal research looks nothing like this anymore.
Case digests are a thing of the past. Now, legal research amounts to some
creative word searches and a click of the mouse.78 Electronic researchers do
not encounter cases through “the lens of key system information.”79 They
are able to access a far greater number of cases on a wider array of topics.
And—most importantly for the present discussion—the emphasis is now on
“words over concepts.”80 As one scholar put it, most lawyers now “spend day
74 See People v. Cheek, No. H031164, 2008 WL 5263647, at *23 n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18,
2008) (citing Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002)).
75 See Robert Berring, On Not Throwing Out the Baby: Planning the Future of Legal Information,
83 CALIF. L. REV. 615, 618-22 (describing the massive overhaul of legal information from paper to
online); Kuh, supra note 9, at 225 (“In this new age of electronically manufactured law, the raw
materials of law—case texts—increasingly reside in digital form and are studied by legal researchers using digital means.”).
76 See Paul Hellyer, Assessing the Influence of Computer-Assisted Legal Research: A Study of California Supreme Court Opinions, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 285, 286-88 (2005) (recounting the history of
computer-assisted legal research).
77 For a detailed description of print-based research, see Kuh, supra note 9, at 241-42.
78 Id. at 242.
79 Id. at 243.
80 See Stinson, supra note 8, at 253 (“[E]lectronic word searching emphasizes, by its very
nature, particular words over concepts.” (footnote omitted)).
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after day in ‘Google-search’ mode—looking for answers to their questions
by typing a word or short phrase into a search box.”81 They “pay less
attention to the reasoning, theory and policy that drive a decision,” and,
instead, they “prioritize speed” and the ability to find “a kernel of phraseology that may support their often incorrect preconceived notions.”82
Several scholars, particularly law librarians, have observed how this
change is negatively impacting legal reasoning, although they lament that
their warnings are falling on “deaf ears.”83 These scholars argue that fewer
people read full cases anymore (or even case summaries),84 that it is easier
for researchers to find just what they are looking for and nothing more
(exacerbating confirmation bias),85 and that the distinction between holdings and dicta is eroding.86
A common thread in these warnings is that keyword searching perpetuates a misunderstanding of context. Lawyers now look “for isolated word
combinations,” causing a fear that the words they find may seem relevant to
their argument but do not tell the whole story of the case in which they
were uttered.87 It is very tempting just “to locate language in an opinion
that, on its face, supports a particular position, even when the case itself
does not stand for that proposition.”88 This tendency led Molly Lien to

81
82

Id. at 250.
Molly W. Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM. U. L. REV.
85, 89 (1998).
83 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 226 (“Scholars, anthropologists and law librarians caution that the
shift from print to electronic research will significantly impact the law in myriad ways. To date,
however, these predictions and warnings have fallen on deaf ears.”); see also Robert Berring, Legal
Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1673, 1706-07 (2000)
(describing the potential future of legal research as one where “the researcher accords cognitive
authority to the search system” and relies on “the algorithm that drives the system” instead of her
own analytical skill); Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the
Computer Age, 88 LAW. LIBR. J. 338, 342, 345 (1996) (explaining the change in our legal research
habits, from one that began with “the specific point of law” to one that begins with “distilling this
information into a computer search strategy” based on “words or short phrases”).
84 See Kuh, supra note 9, at 246; Lien, supra note 82, at 130-32.
85 See Thomas L. Fowler, Holding, Dictum . . . Whatever, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 139, 141 (2003)
(noting the temptation legal researchers face when they see “a sentence that says what [they] want
it to say” to “conclude that [their] research is done”); Kuh, supra note 9, at 254-55.
86 Stinson, supra note 8, at 260 (“Regardless of how one defines holding (and therefore dicta), it is clear that judges and lawyers routinely confuse the two.”).
87 Lien, supra note 82, at 130-31; see also Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in
the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 285, 297 (2001) (suggesting that the computer
based legal researcher—as opposed to the print researcher—starts with facts and finds cases with
facts similar to his own without appreciating different contexts).
88 Stinson, supra note 8, at 222.
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argue that just as television created “‘sound bite’ journalism,” so does
computerized legal research create “‘law-byte’ reasoning.”89
It is not hard to see how this new research method can lead to factual
precedents. For one thing, the sheer number of cases to research has vastly
expanded. Who cares, for example, about the difference between unpublished and published opinions when both are available on Westlaw and
are easily retrieved through the same word search?90 With more cases to
research, it is now easier to find cases with similar facts (even seemingly
obscure ones): “[R]esearch in print sources inclines one toward legal
principles while keyword searching is more apt to generate groups of cases
based on similarities of facts.”91 Instead of the old way of starting with the
legal principle and identifying cases on topic that have similar facts, search
strategies now run backwards: we look for factually similar language first
and devise the rules after.92
Putting aside whether this is a good shift in emphasis or not, the modern way we engage in legal research makes a prior court’s factual statements
easier to find and easier to use in legal arguments later. Anything any judge
or justice has ever said about any topic (neuroscience, climate change,
psychological harm from rape) is only a click of the mouse away.93

89
90

Lien, supra note 82, at 88.
See F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the
Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 579 (2002) (explaining how even unpublished opinions are now
available online and, thus, able to be used as precedents).
91 Id. at 583; see also Margolis, supra note 6, at 935 (“[E]lectronic search technology pushes
the researcher to focus on facts rather than legal concepts.”). Some say the extension of potential
precedents with relevant facts leads to better legal arguments, but the expansion is not recognized
as a universal good. In Great Britain, for example, there is a concerted effort to stop publication of
cases with redundant legal principles (even if the facts are the same). These British efforts,
however, have been only moderately successful in the Internet age. In recent years, the number of
unpublished cases becoming digitally available in Great Britain has dramatically increased. See
Hanson, supra note 90, at 565-66.
92 Margolis, supra note 6, at 935 (“Without an understanding of how the source fits into the
broad context of legal analysis, the researcher is likely to focus more on the factual content of the
information.”).
93 I acknowledge that the digital revolution also makes it easier for lower courts to access
factual sources without resorting to the ones cited in the U.S. Reports. The fact that these courts
are still citing the Justices’ endorsement of factual claims (as opposed to just the underlying
sources themselves), however, suggests that something more than information access is motivating
their search for authorities. For more discussion on this point, see infra Section III.B.
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2. “Fatter” Supreme Court Opinions
Enter the second relevant change that leads to factual precedents: the
look and feel of judicial opinions, particularly those of the Supreme Court,
are changing. Opinions are longer.94 They include more citations than ever
before.95 And—of particular relevance for the present discussion—there is a
new emphasis on factual claims reinforced by empirical data and secondary
authorities.96 As a result, the information pool of available Supreme Court
factual observations has greatly expanded.
Perhaps because we can all access infinite information on our phones,
there is a new hunger for empirical support in judicial decisions and legal
arguments. There is also a wide-open field of data to support that demand.97
Fred Schauer and Virginia Wise observed over ten years ago that the advent
of computers has led to an increasing number of citations of “nonlegal”
sources in Supreme Court opinions.98 There is no evidence that the trend is
losing steam.99
Consequently, the factual dimensions of arguments—particularly legislative facts—are taking center stage. This “widespread empirical turn”100 is
particularly visible in Supreme Court decisions, but this trend is not limited
there.101 In fact one commentator has observed that there is a new tendency
94 See Black & Spriggs, supra note 3, at 645, 663 fig.7 (documenting the Court’s “general
increase in opinion length”).
95 See Cross et al., supra note 5, at 532 fig.1 (charting an increase in the number of case citations in U.S. Supreme Court opinions over time).
96 I am not alone in noticing this trend. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 58, at 550 (“Increasingly, commentators and litigants are checking the modern Court’s fact-finding on the basis of empirical
research that only sometimes supports, and often contradicts, the Court’s ‘best guesses’ about the
world.”); Meares, supra note 6, at 851 (“Recent studies show that, over the past decade, judges and
lawyers have begun to cite to empirical studies in their work with increasing regularity.”); Zick,
supra note 6, at 129 (describing and critiquing the increased use of empirical methods and data to
decide constitutional cases).
97 See Schauer & Wise, supra note 45, at 497 (stating that “[s]ince 1990, the Supreme Court’s
citation of nonlegal sources has increased dramatically”); see also Berring, supra note 83, at 1690
(“Today’s Court can turn to a world of sources from all corners of scholarship . . . .”); id. at 1689
(“Hundreds of cases are cited, but so are authorities from all corners of the information galaxy.”).
98 See Berring, supra note 83, at 1683-89 (noting that a review of the 1899 U.S. Reports shows
the Court relying on statutes, cases, and the record below but little else, whereas a review of the
1999 U.S. Reports shows “an infinite universe” of authorities); Wes Daniels, “Far Beyond the Law
Reports”: Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions October Terms 1900,
1940, and 1978, 76 LAW LIBR. J. 1, 4 (1983) (noting a significant increase in the Supreme Court’s
use of secondary sources over the twentieth century).
99 See Margolis, supra note 6, at 937 (noting the rise in internet citations and citations to
nonlegal authorities in judicial opinions).
100 Zick, supra note 6.
101 See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 90, at 587-88 (showing samples from the New Jersey Supreme
Court with similar patterns); Hellyer, supra note 76, at 293-94 tbls.1-2 (noting that the highest
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of lower courts to “mimic” the style of the Supreme Court102—including the
way the Justices tell long narratives that are peppered with facts. As Second
Circuit Judge Leval has characterized: “[W]ith the central role courts have
increasingly played in resolving important social questions, we have come to
see ourselves as something considerably grander—as lawgivers, teachers,
fonts of wisdom, even keepers of the national conscience. This change of
image has helped transform dicta from trivia into a force.”103
There is no reason to think factual precedents are limited to Supreme
Court factual claims (as opposed to lower courts quoting language coming
from courts in other jurisdictions). This Article, however, limits its discussion of factual precedents to citations in the U.S. Reports because of the
attention those opinions draw across jurisdictions and because the Supreme
Court—perhaps more than any other court—gives reasons for its decisions
that are rich with factual assertions.
One more change to Supreme Court opinions merits consideration. The
emphasis on empiricism and the ease with which information can be
accessed means Justices are not just making bald factual claims about the
world; instead, their claims are commonly backed up with supporting
evidence from numerous sources, such as law review articles, medical
journals, newspapers, and websites, to name a few.104 Some speculate this is
due to the increased role of law clerks, who—as Judge Posner famously put
it—“feel naked” without an authority to quote and cite.105 But whatever the
reason, the Court’s factual statements about the world are now commonly
accompanied by nonlegal authorities.106
court in California is handing down longer opinions, citing more cases, and relying on more
secondary authorities than ever before, but concluding that there is not enough evidence to
attribute the changes to computer-based legal research alone).
102 Stinson, supra note 8, at 221-22.
103 Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249,
1256 (2006).
104 For a collection of authorities the Court uses to support its factual claims, see generally
my prior work on the subject. Larsen, supra note 7.
105 Judge Posner explained, “Law clerks, however, feel naked unless they are quoting and
citing cases and other authorities.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE
AND REFORM 148 (1996).
106 In Roe v. Wade, for example, the Court asserted without citation that “[m]aternity, or
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future . . . . Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care.” 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The Court just left it at that.
By contrast, more recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court made the same observation and
followed it with fourteen citations to fact-based authorities, from medical journals to New York
Times Magazine articles to briefing papers from the American Psychiatric Association. 550 U.S.
124, 183 n.7 (2007). See also Schauer & Wise, supra note 45, at 497, for documentation on the rise
of nonlegal authorities in Supreme Court opinions.
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Why is that change relevant? It is quite possible that the addition of a
factual authority makes a Justice’s statement seem more precedent worthy
and, therefore, more likely to be true or safer for a lower court to cite. To
evoke a familiar analogy, when a law professor makes a claim about physics
in an article, a dutiful law review editor will ask her for a footnote. That
editor takes comfort if the physics footnote comes from another law review
article, even if that second law professor has no relevant expertise with
physics.
Likewise, a statistical study on neuroscience or climate change, if approved by the U.S. Supreme Court, can seem safely vetted to a lower court
that knows nothing about the subject. Authority from a familiar source can
be persuasive even if it is misplaced.107 And the question for the day is
whether the confidence lower courts place in Supreme Court factfinding is
appropriate.
II. EXAMPLES OF FACTUAL PRECEDENTS
So exactly which Supreme Court factual statements are repeated by lower
courts and for what purpose are they being used? The following Part
attempts to answer that question with a list of illustrative examples.
Bear in mind there are two variables at play in an in-depth exploration
of factual precedents: (1) the way the Supreme Court used the fact originally,
and (2) the way a lower court reuses it later. As I have detailed elsewhere,
Supreme Court Justices use generalized facts in many different ways: to set
the stage, to highlight the importance of an issue, to refute or underscore an
argument with empirical ammunition, and sometimes to answer a dispositive question in the case.108 Lower courts follow suit; they use facts with the
same variation, and they do so by citing language from Supreme Court
opinions as authority—often without regard to how the Court employed the
fact originally.
To narrow the focus of the present discussion, let us hold one variable
constant or rather put one type of factual precedent to the side. I exclude
from my discussion examples of lower courts citing facts to tell a narrative
or to anchor a discussion with rhetorical flourish. For example, several lower
courts cite the Supreme Court for the fact that the Food and Drug Administration

107 See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1943 (“As with the parent saying, ‘Because I said so,’ authority is
in an important way the fallback position when substantive persuasion is ineffective.”).
108 I have previously provided illustrations of these different uses of Supreme Court facts.
See generally Larsen, supra note 7.
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(FDA) is an understaffed agency with limited resources.109 They do this for
rhetorical purposes: to show the need for drug manufacturers to monitor
the safety of their own products. But the fact that the FDA is understaffed
likely is not the lynchpin in these decisions, or at least the opinions do not
read as if this fact were outcome-determinative. It seems less controversial
that lower courts would use language from Supreme Court opinions in this
way.
I therefore do not discuss a lower court’s gratuitous use of factual precedents. Instead, the examples below are all factual precedents somehow used
to address dispositive questions that the lower court must answer before
resolving the case.110 Put bluntly, these examples are not window-dressing
factual precedents; they are citations to the Supreme Court for facts that
matter.111 It is perhaps more surprising that lower courts use Supreme Court
factual assertions in this way, but it is not at all rare.
There are surely many types of factual precedent—many ways a lower
court can reuse factual language from a higher court. Examples are plentiful, but the ones I discuss below are organized into five categories: “imported factual precedents” (facts imported from one context to another);
“strategic factual precedents” (facts to supplement the record for a calculated purpose); “aftermath factual precedents” (facts from a landmark opinion
used by a lower court to answer residual questions); “historical factual
precedents” (facts about how the world existed in a prior time); and “premise facts” (facts that form the premise of a legal rule).
These categories are not meant to be exhaustive nor are they mutually
exclusive. I offer them purely for the ease of explaining the typical ways that
lower courts are using Supreme Court factual assertions as authorities to
decide outcome-determinative questions in the cases before them.

109 See, e.g., Lefaivre v. KV Pharm. Co., 636 F.3d 935, 940 (8th Cir. 2011); Demahy v. Actavis, Inc.,
593 F.3d 428, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2010).
110 Of course, a reader of judicial opinions can never know for sure what influence the factual
precedent had on the lower court’s decisionmaking process. In all of the following cases, however,
the court cites a Supreme Court opinion for a factual proposition that it must answer to resolve
the dispute. For reasons discussed further below, that is enough to cause alarm.
111 As we shall see, on occasion, a lower court will reuse a Supreme Court fact to answer a
dispositive question that was originally employed by a Justice only rhetorically as windowdressing.
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A. “Imported Factual Precedents”: Facts Imported from
One Context to Another
Sometimes a lower court takes a factual claim made by a Supreme
Court Justice in one context and uses it to make a different point in a
separate context. These are what I call “imported factual precedents.”
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin provides an excellent example in a
case called State v. Ninham.112 Omer Ninham was convicted of murder and
sentenced to life in prison without parole. He was fourteen at the time of
the murder, and Ninham argued that fourteen is too young to justify a life
sentence without parole (a position eventually vindicated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in June 2012113). Ninham brought to the court’s attention
psychological and neurological studies demonstrating that fourteen-yearolds generally have immature brain development and are less capable of
responsible decisionmaking.114
The Wisconsin court rejected this factual claim because, “in other contexts, psychologists have promoted scientific evidence that arrives at the
precise opposite conclusions about 14-year-olds.”115 In support, the court
cited Justice Scalia’s dissent in Roper v. Simmons.116 Justice Scalia, in turn,
cited an amicus brief filed by the American Psychological Association
(APA) in a completely separate abortion case for the conclusion that
“numerous psychological treatises and studies” demonstrated that “14 and
15-year-old juveniles are mature enough to decide whether to obtain an
abortion without parental involvement.”117
Justice Scalia’s dissent, which relied on an amicus brief from an abortion
case, is the only piece of counter evidence the Wisconsin court used to
reject Ninham’s claim. This factual precedent does not come from a majority
of the Supreme Court, was obviously used by Justice Scalia as a barb about
the APA’s alleged inconsistency, and is based on studies that are at least
twenty years old and were selected to make an entirely different point about
juvenile maturity. It is hard to believe that the Wisconsin court read the
APA studies in the abortion amicus brief, nor is it likely that the APA had
any indication that the studies on brain development it highlighted in a

112
113

797 N.W.2d 451 (Wis. 2011).
See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (holding that “mandatory life without
parole” for those under eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment).
114 Ninham, 797 N.W.2d at 478-79.
115 Id. at 473.
116 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile
offenders).
117 Ninham, 797 N.W.2d at 473 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 617-18) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court abortion brief in 1990 would be used twenty-one years later
by a lower court to justify a juvenile life sentence without parole.
Wisconsin jurists are not alone in importing facts from Supreme Court
opinions into new contexts. In a 2011 multiparty insurance dispute, a district
court in West Virginia was asked to interpret a “bodily injury exclusion” to
an insurance policy.118 The court had to decide whether two women who
were sexually molested by an employee had suffered “bodily injuries” under
West Virginia law. The court held that “while the trauma of sexual assault
and sexual abuse cannot be understated, the injuries resulting from a sexual
assault are often largely emotional.”119 For support, it cited a law review
article and the majority opinion from the Supreme Court in Kennedy v.
Louisiana.120 The district court quoted language from Kennedy that rape has
a permanent emotional and sometimes physical impact on the victim.121 The
district court italicized the word “sometimes” and used the quote to emphasize that rape is more often emotionally damaging as opposed to physically
damaging.122
In this example, the lower court not only imported a fact to a new context,
but it also gave it a new emphasis. In Kennedy, the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty as a punishment for someone who rapes a child.123 The
language picked up by the district court came from Justice Kennedy as he
expressed sympathy for the victim in the case.124 The studies in question on
the emotional trauma of rape came from the book The Search for Healing. It
is hard to believe that either Justice Kennedy or the authors of those studies
expected that their words would later be used to downplay the likelihood of
rape’s physical damage.
Once one starts to look for them, examples of imported factual precedents are everywhere. They include: data on brain development originally
cited in a Supreme Court case discussing juvenile offenders and subsequently

118 See Charleston Area Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins., No. 09-0573, 2011 WL 2161534, at
*1, *7 (S.D. W. Va. June 1, 2011) (finding that an insurer failed to demonstrate that a policyholder’s
claim fell under the bodily injury exclusion).
119 Id. at *8.
120 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
121 Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 2011 WL 2161534 at *8 n.10.
122 The district court used this assertion from the Supreme Court to supplement its review
of the record and in order to conclude that no bodily injury took place in the case before it. Id.
123 554 U.S. at 446-47.
124 Id. at 435 (“Rape has a permanent psychological, emotional, and sometimes physical impact on the child.” (citing CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY & KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE:
THE SEARCH FOR HEALING 2-24, 111-12 (1990))).
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used to justify striking down an overbroad speech restriction by a university;125
statistics on mild cases of carpal tunnel syndrome originally collected by
Justice O’Connor in an American with Disabilities Act case and subsequently used to justify a ruling for the defense under a different statute;126 and
information about GPS tracking technology from Justice Alito’s concurrence in United States v. Jones, which was later used by a trial court to
suppress evidence gained from a different technology that enables police to
see the basic geographic location where cell phone calls are made.127
As explained above, new digital research modes make these factual
claims from Supreme Court decisions easy to find. It does not seem to
matter if the studies or statistics were assembled in the same context, used
with the same emphasis, or have subsequently been repudiated by newer
findings.
B. “Strategic Factual Precedents”: Facts to Supplement the
Record for a Calculated Purpose
The next category of factual precedents should not be surprising given
human nature. As anyone who has ever written a high school term paper can
confirm, it is very tempting for an author to use facts the way “drunks use
lampposts . . . more for support and not illumination.”128 A judge, in other
words, can use factual precedents strategically—not to inform herself about
the world, but to bolster a preexisting view with something to cite. I call
this a “strategic factual precedent.”129

125
126

McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).
Artega v. Brink’s, Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 671 (2008) (citing Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), for the proposition that “[s]tudies have further
shown that, even without surgical treatment, one quarter of carpal tunnel cases resolve in one
month,” and using that finding to hold that a mere diagnosis of carpal tunnel syndrome does not
mean that the plaintiff was disabled during employment and entitled to relief under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act).
127 See Commonwealth v. Pitt, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 445, 447 (Super. Ct. 2012) (“[S]ociety’s
expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would not . . . secretly monitor and
catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.” (citing Justice
Alito’s concurrence in United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012))); see also Lomack v. City of
Newark, No. 04-6085, 2005 WL 2077479, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2005) (using social science data
originally relied upon in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), for the importance of diversity
in the law school classroom to justify an affirmative action program designed for firefighters),
rev’d, 463 F.3d 303 (3d Cir. 2006).
128 See Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (quoting Second Circuit Judge Robert D. Sack).
129 Many of the other categories I have identified overlap with this one. An imported precedent, for example, can also be a strategic one.
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A great example of a strategic factual precedent is an example and a
counterexample all in one. In Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management, environmental groups sued to challenge a federal agency’s approval of
oil and gas lease sales.130 The question before the district court was whether
those groups had standing to proceed.131 The plaintiffs argued that they
were injured because the agency’s decision led to an increased risk of
environmental harm due to climate change.132 They cited the “clear scientific consensus” of climate change documented by the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts v. EPA.133 This was not enough, however, for the district court:
“At this stage of the litigation, plaintiffs must come forward with more than
just bare assertions of perceived climate change.”134 Accordingly, the data
gleaned from Justice Stevens’s opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA was insufficient to create an injury in fact—no factual precedent.
Several pages later, however, the district court sang a different tune.
When it arrived at the causation prong of its standing analysis—the question of whether climate change (if true) could be caused by the defendant’s
conduct—the court then cited statistics pulled from Massachusetts v. EPA on
the relative paucity of the U.S. transportation sector’s contribution to global
warming.135 In other words, the facts from Massachusetts v. EPA bound the
lower court when that court wanted to be bound but did not pose an
obstacle when the court wanted to ignore them.
A similar strategic use of a factual precedent is to declare an issue settled
when it is not obviously so. In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the
Supreme Court upheld an Indiana law that required voters to present photo
identification.136 The state justification behind the law was to prevent inperson voter fraud. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, acknowledged
that there was slim evidence of in-person voter fraud on the record in Indiana,
but he reasoned that the theoretical possibility of such conduct justified the
law.137
A year following Crawford, litigation emerged in New Jersey over similar
“ballot security” initiatives.138 The Republicans argued that the measures

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

816 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2011).
Id. at 1123.
Id. at 1123-24.
Id. at 1127 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521-23 (2007)).
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1136.
553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008).
Id.
Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d 575 (2009).
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were justified because of the real risk of in-person voter fraud, and the
Democrats countered that cries of such fraud were exaggerated and that the
security led to voter intimidation. Currently, there is a robust debate among
election law scholars and empiricists about whether in-person voter fraud
actually happens today.139 Indeed, the New Jersey District Court received
“mountains of documentary evidence” from both sides on precisely that
factual question.140
The court resolved the controversy not by relying on the evidence it
admitted, but by closely scrutinizing the separate opinions in Crawford. It
cited Justice Souter’s dissent for the fact that in-person voter fraud is very
rare (citing studies to that effect).141 Next, it inspected the three footnotes
from Justice Stevens in which he provided examples of voter fraud that were
“documented by respected historians.”142 After debunking Justice Stevens’s
examples and counting the number of Justices who signed on to the dissent,
the New Jersey District Court declared that
the rulings by Justices Stevens and Souter in Crawford refute the RNC’s
argument that in-person voter fraud poses a danger to the integrity of modern elections . . . . Five Justices—a binding majority of the Court—
joined in those Opinions. Accordingly, it is settled that in-person fraud is
extremely rare, and any argument . . . to the contrary must be rejected.143

Thus, the New Jersey District Court declared that the Justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court would be the final arbiters of this ongoing debate
instead of examining the record before it about the existence of voter fraud
in its state. It made this decision despite the fact that the Justices were clear

139 Compare JOHN FUND, STEALING ELECTIONS: HOW VOTER FRAUD THREATENS OUR
DEMOCRACY 6 (2004) (“Election fraud whether it’s phony voter registrations, illegal absentee
ballots, shady recounts or old-fashioned ballot-box stuffing can be found in every part of the
United States.”), and Hans A. von Spakovsky, Stolen Identities, Stolen Votes: A Case Study in Voter
Impersonation, LEGAL MEMORANDUM, Mar. 10, 2008, at 1, 1 (“Contrary to claims made by
prominent newspapers and attorneys, in person voting fraud is a real problem.”), with Justin
Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 ELECTION L.J. 97, 110
(2012) (“[A]ll of the available evidence demonstrates that the incidence of any fraud that
identification rules could prevent is extraordinarily rare.”), and Richard L. Hasen, Fraud Reform?,
SLATE MAG. (Feb. 22, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/
2006/02/fraud_reform.html (“Beyond a few isolated instances and anecdotes, there is precious
little evidence of the kind of voter fraud a state voter ID card requirement would deter.”).
140 Democratic Nat’l Comm., 671 F. Supp. 2d at 578.
141 Id. at 608.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 609-10 (footnote omitted).
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in Crawford that their decision was based solely on the Indiana record before
them.144
It is worth noting that although a lower court may be reticent to cite a
dissenting opinion from the Supreme Court as legal precedent, the same
reluctance does not hold true for facts. Factual precedents often involve
language from concurring and dissenting Supreme Court opinions. Justice
Thomas’s dissent in Grutter, for example, reciting evidence on the benefit of
historically black colleges to African American student success, has been
relied on by a district court to uphold a race-conscious admissions policy of
an all Native Hawaiian school.145 Justice Breyer’s concurrence “documenting” the increased rate of race-based stereotypes in jury selection was used
by the Seventh Circuit to justify finding a Batson violation in a state’s use of
preemptory strikes.146 And statistics from a Justice Ginsburg dissent that
found that students who participated in extracurricular activities were less
likely to do drugs were used by two different lower courts to strike down
the drug-testing policies for school sports as underinclusive, simply because
they did not target “student slackers.”147 One of those courts, in fact, used
the statistics to rebut contrary evidence on the record given by the school
therapist who ran the drug diversion program.148
At a bare minimum, the popularity of strategic factual precedents reveals
the lack of uniformity in the lower courts about the proper authoritative
force Supreme Court facts should carry. The current rule seems to be to use
them when it is convenient and to avoid them when it is not.

144 This use of Crawford by the lower courts is particularly worrisome given a recent statement by Justice Stevens on the issue. After Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit opinion writer in
Crawford, recently announced that he made a mistake in the case, Justice Stevens told a reporter
that he too harbored doubts about whether voter ID laws actually deter voter fraud: “My opinion
should not be taken as authority that voter-ID laws are always OK. . . . The decision in the case is
state-specific and record specific.” See Jess Bravin, Voter-ID Laws Worry Jurist, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
17, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579141701228734132.
145 See Doe v. Kamehameha Schools/Bernice Pauahi Bishop, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1169 (D.
Haw. 2003) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364-65 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting)).
146 See United States v. Stephens, 421 F.3d 503, 515 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
147 See Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 92 (Pa. 2003) (citing Bd. of Ed. of
Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 853 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting)); see also Brown v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist., No. C061972, 2010 WL 3442147, at
*11 n.13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Earls, 536 U.S. at 853).
148 Brown, 2010 WL 3442147, at *11.
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C. “Aftermath Factual Precedents”: Facts to Answer Residual Questions
Following Landmark Legal Decisions
If strategic factual precedents are used the way “drunks use lampposts”—for support only—one is left to wonder if there are any “sober”
examples of lower courts using Supreme Court facts. Of course, it is
impossible to know for sure what influence any authority has on a judge, but
there is one particular type of Supreme Court fact that lower courts seem to
carefully scrutinize for “illumination” purposes.
When the Supreme Court issues a landmark decision, it often reserves follow-up questions for a later day. This inevitably spawns litigation on these
residual questions, and, it turns out, lower courts look to what the Justices
originally said about the relevant facts to predict how they might answer the
new legal question. Lower courts will readily admit that the new question
was not addressed by the Supreme Court; nonetheless, they claim that the
Justices have “winked at the issue.”149 I call this use of factual claims “aftermath factual precedents.”
Two prominent examples of aftermath factual precedents come to mind.
The first group of cases follows the Supreme Court’s decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller, which held that the Second Amendment protects an
individual’s right to own a firearm for lawful purposes.150 Following this
landmark decision, lower courts were confronted with many new legal
questions, such as: Is the right to possess a firearm fundamental so that it
should be incorporated against the states?151 Does the Second Amendment
protect the right to own weapons not at issue in Heller (like air pistols or
knifes)?152 And, does the Second Amendment invalidate other laws criminalizing certain gun possession?153 The Supreme Court specifically made
149 People v. Carreira, 893 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 n.1 (City Ct. of Watertown 2010), abrogated by
People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 2013). In Carreira, a New York court found a DUI breath
test to be inadmissible. Id. The court relied on a study about the manipulation of forensic evidence
highlighted by the Supreme Court. Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 31819 (2009)). It applied the study’s findings to the facts at hand, while admitting that the MelendezDiaz Court did not apply its holding to testing records. The Supreme Court instead “wink[ed] at
the issue” and “excruciatingly avoid[ed]” it. Id.
150 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
151 See, e.g., Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 446 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e must decide whether
the Second Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth [Amendment], a question
that Heller explicitly left open.”).
152 See, e.g., Wooden v. United States, 6 A.3d 833, 839 (D.C. 2010) (“[W]e cannot find it
‘plain’—‘clear’ or ‘obvious’—that the Heller Court would extend its ruling to knives.”); People v.
Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d 801, 808-10 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (determining that air pistols were not defined
within the ambiguous definition of Heller).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1164-68 (W.D. Tenn. 2009)
(evaluating whether the Heller decision extended to all laws restricting firearm ownership).

88

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 59

clear that it was not addressing some of these questions in Heller, while
others it just ignored.154
As post-Heller litigation made its way through the lower courts, the Supreme
Court’s historical account of how and why the Second Amendment was
adopted (which is, after all, a question of fact) became very important in
answering follow-up legal questions. One plaintiff, for example, challenged
a New York law banning air pistols (which differed from the handgun ban at
issue in Heller).155 The trial court first recited the Heller majority’s historical
account of what eighteenth-century citizens thought “arms” meant, and then
it concluded that air pistols were not arms because they are not used in selfdefense as members of the founding generation had assumed their arms to
be.156 The lower court did not rely on the holding of Heller, but its historical
evidence came straight from the U.S. Reports.
Other courts looked to the facts contained in the Heller dissent for guidance in answering these aftermath legal questions. In a constitutional
challenge to the federal statute prohibiting firearm possession by felons, a
district court in Tennessee cited statistics on gun violence from Justice
Breyer’s Heller dissent in order to establish that the government’s interest
behind the law is “not only ‘legitimate,’ but also ‘important.’”157
Finally, the historical facts in Heller were also used by at least one lower
court to anticipate the obvious follow-up legal question (later answered by
the Supreme Court in McDonald v. Chicago158) about whether the Second
Amendment should be incorporated against the states. To answer that
question, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Heller reveals evidence . . .
[that] the right to keep and bear arms shares ancestry” with other fundamental rights.159 It uses Heller’s description of the “behavior and words of
the colonists” to demonstrate the importance of the right and ultimately to
conclude from the Court’s “survey of our history” that the right to bear
arms is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”160
The point is not to criticize the Supreme Court’s historical account, but
merely to note that the history mounted in Heller to answer one question
was then used subsequently by lower courts to answer separate legal questions
154
155
156
157
158

Heller, 554 U.S. at 681.
Nivar, 915 N.Y.S.2d at 802-03.
Id. at 808-09.
Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (citation omitted).
561 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment should be incorporated
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment).
159 Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 451-52 (9th Cir. 2009).
160 Id. at 452-54.
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that followed. The Court’s historical work, in other words, serves two
purposes: to answer today’s legal question in the U.S. Reports and tomorrow’s legal question in the Federal Reporter.
A second example of aftermath factual precedents involves questions
that followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia banning the
execution of individuals who are “mentally retarded.”161 Justice Stevens,
writing for the Atkins majority, specifically left it to the states to define
“mental retardation” for purposes of applying the death penalty.162 Although
he declined to set a national definition, however, Justice Stevens did have
words to say on the subject.163 In explaining the defense’s evidence that
Atkins was “mildly mentally retarded,” Justice Stevens referred to definitions from the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) and
the American Psychiatric Association (APA).164 Although the AAMR’s
definition had eliminated the classification based on IQ score, the APA
definition still retained it.165 Thus, Justice Stevens combined both authorities and explained: “[M]ental retardation require[s] not only subaverage
intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations in adaptive skills.”166
He further noted that the “cutoff IQ score for the intellectual function” of a
mentally retarded person is “between 70 and 75 or lower.”167
Following Atkins, whether or not someone qualifies as mentally retarded
can literally be a question of life and death. As documented by Peggy
Tobolowsky, “assessment procedures vary considerably” by state; some are
set by statute, while others are set by court decision.168 This variation has
spawned many challenges to the adequacy of any given state’s rule on how
much mental evaluation is necessary. Prisoners often seek additional
evidentiary hearings on their mental state.169
Interestingly, to answer these challenges, some lower courts have relied
on the dicta in Atkins about the definition of mental retardation—even
though Justice Stevens specifically disclaimed settling the issue.170 These
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Id. at 317.
Id. at 308.
Id.
Id. at 308 n.3.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 309 n.5.
See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath: Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders and
Excluding Them from Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 78, 102 (2003) (noting that ten of the twenty capital
punishment states have legislatively or judicially adopted procedures to implement Atkins and that
these procedures require varying degrees of expert input and evaluation).
169 Id. at 138-40.
170 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-18.
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courts quote Justice Stevens for the proposition that the IQ test is the
“standard instrument” for assessing mental retardation, and then they use
that language about the IQ cutoff to deny requests for additional clinical
assessment.171
Death penalty scholars and psychologists have warned that strict adherence to an IQ test alone does not adequately measure mental retardation—
particularly without reference to the standard measurement of error of these
tests.172 In addition, the AAMR—the authority relied on by the Atkins
Court—now specifically “cautions against the use of a fixed cutoff point
regarding IQ scores in the determination of mental retardation.”173 But
whether those arguments are right or wrong is not the point. What matters
instead is that lower courts are using dicta in landmark decisions to answer
follow-up questions specifically reserved by the Supreme Court for another
day. They are, in effect, attributing precedential power to language not
meant to be precedential.
D. Historical Factual Precedents
One special brand of factual precedent merits a pause: the “historical
factual precedent.” This precedent is evident when courts invoke what the
Supreme Court has said about history without re-examining the relevant
historical account.

171 See, e.g., Hearn v. Thaler, 669 F.3d 265, 273 (5th Cir. 2012) (stating that “relying primarily
on the [full-scale] IQ tests here is reasonable and more likely to result in consistent mental
retardation determinations because the tests have been widely acknowledged as ‘the standard
instrument in the United States for assessing intellectual functioning’”); Thomas v. Quarterman,
335 F. App’x 386, 391 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); Carroll v. Crosby, No. 05-0857, 2008 WL 2557555,
at *15 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2008) (denying prisoner’s request for evidentiary hearing on mental
retardation and upholding the trial court’s conclusion that he was not mentally retarded based
upon “a reasonable application of the Atkins criteria”).
172 See Tobolowsky, supra note 168, at 139 (“[S]tates that use a rigid IQ cutoff score of seventy for the intellectual functioning component may be excluding some individuals otherwise falling
within the accepted clinical definition.”); see also John M. Fabian et al., Life, Death, and IQ: It’s
Much More Than Just a Score, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 399, 413 (2011) (pointing out the standard
deviation in IQ tests, and arguing that the APA never intended to enshrine an IQ cutoff for
mental retardation); Geraldine W. Young, A More Intelligent and Just Atkins: Adjusting for the Flynn
Effect in Capital Determinations of Mental Retardation or Intellectual Disability, 65 VAND. L. REV. 615,
617, 629 (2012) (describing “the Flynn effect” as the theory that IQ scores rise over time, and
arguing that IQ cutoffs in Atkins determinations are therefore inaccurate and unjust); see generally
Stephen J. Ceci et al., The Difficulty of Basing Death Penalty Eligibility on IQ Cutoff Scores for Mental
Retardation, ETHICS & BEHAV., 2003, at 11, 12.
173 Peggy M. Tobolowsky, A Different Path Taken: Texas Capital Offenders’ Post-Atkins Claims
of Mental Retardation, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 75 (2011).
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Examples of historical factual precedents are familiar.174 For instance,
the Supreme Court’s explanation in Hans v. Louisiana175 of the origin of the
Eleventh Amendment has sparked tremendous debate among historians and
jurists as to its accuracy.176 Some historians suggest that the Hans Court
strategically selected statements from the Framers to justify its historical
account, ignoring original evidence to support the opposite constitutional
understanding.177 Right or wrong, however, the Supreme Court’s history on
the Eleventh Amendment is the only historical account on the subject that
matters now because it is the one that binds lower courts for questions of
state sovereign immunity.178
To be sure, historical facts are unique creatures. Some say history is an
interpretive act and not an assertion of fact at all. These scholars claim “it is
not possible to know history scientifically . . . through the mere accumulation of facts.”179 As Amy Kapczynski explains, “The central act of the
historian is one of imagination, rather than recitation or excavation . . . .”180 And yet others, like David Faigman, point out that original
intent is “almost wholly fact based.”181 Questions of history, he tells us, boil
174 One historical precedent showcased in constitutional law is the history of habeas corpus
in pre-revolutionary England. For a detailed account of how one lopsided version of this history
has oriented our understanding of the U.S. Constitution’s Suspension Clause, see Stephen I.
Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2011) (reviewing PAUL D.
HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE (2010)).
175 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
176 See, e.g., Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 61, 68 (1989) (describing the “metamorphosis” of Eleventh Amendment interpretation that began with Hans); Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling
Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260, 1271-72 (1990) (challenging the accuracy of the
historical account in Hans); Michael G. Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh Amendment,
88 COLUM. L. REV. 212, 232-34 (1988) (reviewing JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF
THE UNITED STATES—THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987))
(discussing whether the Hans historical account was correct).
177 See Collins, supra note 176, at 233.
178 See David L. Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98
HARV. L. REV. 61, 71 (1984) (noting that the Court’s “ambiguous language” in Hans “has been
folded into the eleventh amendment itself”); see also John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment
and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1687 (2004) (“In particular, the
Rehnquist Court has not merely adhered to Hans as a matter of stare decisis, but rather has
continued to rely on its strongly purposive technique as a means to resolve unsettled questions
about the very reach and implications of Hans and its progeny.”); Sherry, supra note 176, at 1261-63
(discussing the stare decisis implications of Hans). For some examples of lower court cases that
rely on the history as reported in Hans, see California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831,
844 (9th Cir. 2004), and Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare v. Department of Public
Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1971).
179 Kapczynski, supra note 54, at 1043.
180 Id. at 1051.
181 FAIGMAN, supra note 11, at 46.
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down to questions about what the Framers understood the word “arms” to
mean, or whether the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended
schools to remain segregated.182
Although historical facts contain a strong element of interpretation, they
still meet my working definition of a fact. Like other facts, historical
accounts can be right or wrong, true or false. They, too, are supported by
evidence from nonlegal sources. And, like other facts, historical accounts are
used in various ways. Sometimes they form the backbone of legal rules and
legal decisions (particularly those driven by originalism). But, “[m]ore
likely,” as historian Paul Finkelman argues, “Justices will rummage around
in history, looking for a factoid or some historical anecdote to support the
outcome they want to reach.”183 In this sense, historical facts differ little
from other factual claims.
The precedential treatment of history in Supreme Court opinions is
complicated because one needs to disentangle the precedential power of the
legal rule (perhaps informed by historical facts) from the separate precedential force of the historical account itself.
To understand the difference, consider the decision of the D.C. Circuit
in United States v. Maple.184 There, a policeman had opened a closed compartment in Maple’s car to put away a cell phone, and he discovered a gun
inside; the pivotal question was whether that “purely inadvertent” discovery
by the officer constituted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.185
To answer that question, the court looked to the Supreme Court’s historical account of what the word “search” meant at the time the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.186 It concluded that to search meant to “look over
or through for the purpose of finding something.”187 The D.C. Circuit’s
definition came from Kyllo v. United States.188 The D.C. Circuit was not
citing the holding of Kyllo—indeed, it admitted that the “holding [was] not
particularly relevant.”189 What mattered instead was purely the historical
account in Kyllo and what the Justices said the word “search” meant to
182
183

Id.
Paul Finkelman, The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and History, 88 TEX. L. REV. 353, 356
(2009) (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE
(2009), and PETER C. HOFFER, THE SUPREME COURT: AN ESSENTIAL HISTORY (2007)).
184 334 F.3d 15 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
185 Id. at 20-21.
186 Id. at 19.
187 Id.
188 Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 n.1 (2001)).
189 Id.
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people living in 1787. The D.C. Circuit, in other words, relied on the
Justices as historians rather than as a source of legal rules.
Relying on the Justices as historians has its costs, however. Whatever the
proper nature and precedential effect of historical facts may be, one thing is
certain: on numerous occasions, historical accounts authored by Supreme
Court Justices have been subsequently (and sometimes contemporaneously)
refuted by world-class historians.
Justice Black’s account of the original understanding of the Establishment Clause in Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing
provides one such example.190 Justice Black highlighted Thomas Jefferson’s
phrase “separation of church and state” and claimed it was a widely accepted
notion at the time of the nation’s founding.191 His account, however, has
been generally debunked by religious historians who instead claim that the
“wisdom and influence of Jefferson’s words regarding separation have
developed largely as part of a twentieth-century myth—an account that has
become popular precisely because it has seemed to provide constitutional
authority for separation.”192
Or, to take another example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, Justice Story tells
the tale of how the Fugitive Slave Clause developed as part of a sacred
compromise that enabled the South to join the Union.193 Modern historians,
such as Paul Finkelman, believe this account is flatly wrong.194 Likewise,
Justice Taney’s retelling in Dred Scott v. Sandford195 of the Founding-era
conceptions of free black citizenship is at the very least highly contestable,
and, according to some historians, flies in the face of “overwhelming”
evidence to the contrary.196
The point, of course, is not to beat up on the Justices as amateur historians, but merely to highlight the costs that come with using the Supreme
Court as the ultimate authority on history. Because the Supreme Court’s
historical accounts are elevated in prestige, they become influential in and
190
191
192

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Id. at 16.
PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 11 (2002). For a contemporaneous historical critique of Justice Black’s opinion, see Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court
as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5-6 (1949).
193 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 540 (1842).
194 See generally Paul Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v Pennsylvania and
Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247, 259-63 (1994) (telling “the real
history of the fugitive slave clause”).
195 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend
XIV.
196 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 349-54 (1978).
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out of the courtroom.197 But these examples demonstrate that the Court is
fallible when it interprets history, just like it is vulnerable with respect to
other types of factfinding.
E. “Premise Facts”: Facts that Form the Premise
of a New Legal Rule
I call the final type of factual precedent “premise facts”198 because they
are beliefs about the state of the world that serve as the premise for a legal
rule. All legislative facts share this characteristic to some extent, but some
Supreme Court legal decisions fundamentally depend on a factual claim. In
these cases, lower courts must determine whether the underlying fact itself
is immune from challenges later.
Two examples of constitutional premise facts come to mind: (1) the factual claim in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that corporate
independent expenditures do not corrupt politics,199 and (2) the factual
claim in Grutter v. Bollinger that racially diverse viewpoints improve a law
school education.200 In both cases, legislative facts were critical to the
decision reached. And future lower courts, faced with subsequent litigation
implementing the legal rules, must decide whether to give stare decisis
effect to the factual aspects of the decisions or to reassess each factual claim
according to the record of each case. They must decide, in other words, if a
factual question remains open to challenge with new evidence or if it is
effectively off the table after being settled by the Supreme Court.
Citizens United and the litigation it spawned provide a great example.
Citizens United evaluated a First Amendment challenge to the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, which prohibited corporations from paying for
independent electioneering communications shortly before elections.201

197 See generally John H. Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme
Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 613 (1954) (discussing the assumption of authoritative
value attributed to sources cited by the California Supreme Court’s decisions; presumably, this
assumption is even stronger for the U.S. Supreme Court).
198 I borrow the phrase “premise facts” from Todd Aagaard’s fascinating administrative law
article about such facts in agency statutory interpretation cases. See Todd S. Aagaard, Factual
Premises of Statutory Interpretation in Agency Review Cases, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 366, 372 (2009);
see also Keeton, supra note 62, at 13 (explaining the scope, influence, and nature of facts that serve
as premises for deciding an issue of law, or “premise facts”).
199 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).
200 539 U.S. 306, 325-30 (2003).
201 For a recap of the case and its procedural history (with particular emphasis on the role of
facts), see Zephyr Teachout, Facts in Exile: Corruption and Abstraction in Citizens United v. Federal
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy denied that independent corporate spending corrupts politics.202 Looking at both the record before him
and the record before the Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission,203 an earlier campaign finance case based on a facial challenge to the
same law, Justice Kennedy found there was “scant evidence” that independent corporate expenditures lead to political corruption.204
A year or so later, the Montana Supreme Court had to decide whether
that factual finding bound its court in Western Tradition v. Attorney General.205 In this case, the court evaluated the validity of a 1912 Montana law
that was substantially similar to the federal law in Citizens United—it
forbade corporate campaign expenditures.206 Despite the similarity of the
two laws, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the Montana campaign
finance law.207 Chief Justice McGrath, writing for the majority, explained
that “Citizens United was a case decided under its facts or lack of facts.”208
He distinguished the case with a history of how corporate expenditures
negatively affected Montana elections, complete with studies of how
election spending in Montana was relatively low due to its bar on corporate
election spending.209
Not all of the Montana Justices agreed that a new factual record meant
they were out from under the thumb of Citizens United. Even though Justice
James Nelson dissented, he criticized Citizens United as “utter nonsense.”210
Nevertheless, he felt he was duty-bound to apply it: “The Supreme Court
in Citizens United . . . rejected several asserted governmental interests; and
this Court has now come along, retrieved those interests from the garbage
can, dusted them off, slapped a ‘Made in Montana’ sticker on them, and
held them up as grounds for sustaining a patently unconstitutional state
statute.”211
Justice Nelson predicted that the U.S. Supreme Court would be quick to
reverse the Montana Court. And he was right. Soon after, in a two-paragraph
Election Commission, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 295, 300-02 (2011). Of course, defining what amounts
to corruption is a thorny legal question that is still controversial.
202 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
203 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310.
204 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
205 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011), rev’d sub nom., Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct.
2490 (2012) (per curiam).
206 Id. at 3.
207 Id. at 13.
208 Id. at 6.
209 Id. at 6-8.
210 Id. at 35 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
211 Id. at 33.
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per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court summarily reversed the Montana
Supreme Court, holding that there could be “no serious doubt” that such a
result was compelled by Citizens United.212 One way to interpret that
message (although, as explained in Part IV below, not the only way) is to
assume that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices established a factual precedent
that settled once and for all the question about the potentially corrupting
nature of corporate campaign expenditures.
Another example of a premise fact—one embraced perhaps by those
with different ideological preferences—is the premise fact in Grutter v.
Bollinger that a racially diverse class improves a law school education.213 In
Grutter, Justice O’Connor affirmed Michigan Law School’s affirmative
action program by relying on classroom diversity as a compelling government interest and by deferring to the law school’s assessment on that
score.214 She supported her legal conclusion with empirical social science
research connecting student diversity and educational achievement.215
Similar to the facts in Citizens United, this claim is controversial and not
without competing authority for the opposite claim.216 But the relevant
observation here is that the Court’s holding depends on a factual understanding of the world: that students exposed to more racial diversity possess
greater active thinking processes and academic skills.217
How should lower courts evaluate affirmative action programs postGrutter? Can a record before a lower court citing social science research that
downplays the educational benefits of racial diversity—like the studies
recited by Justice Thomas in his Grutter dissent218—justify a different legal
ruling?

212
213

Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam).
539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003). This premise fact was reaffirmed in Fisher v. University of Texas
at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
214 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003).
215 Id. at 330. For a collection of the social science research used by Justice O’Connor in
Grutter and for examples of countervailing authority, see Michael Heise, Brown Undone?: The
Future of Integration in Seattle After PICS v. Seattle School District No. 1, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
863, 878-80 (2008).
216 See, e.g., Mikyong M. Kim & Clifton F. Conrad, The Impact of Historically Black Colleges
and Universities on the Academic Success of African-American Students, 47 RES. IN HIGHER EDUC.
399, 421 (2006) (finding that African American students had a similar probability of obtaining a
bachelor’s degree whether they attended a historically Black college or university or a historically
White college or university).
217 See Heise, supra note 215, at 878 (discussing how the majority in Grutter relied on findings
from the expert witness report of Patricia Y. Gurin).
218 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The Fifth Circuit, at least, did not think so. In Fisher v. University of
Texas at Austin, the litigants and interested parties marshaled factual evidence that disclaimed any connection between racial diversity and educational success.219 The Fifth Circuit did not bite, explaining “it is neither our
role nor purpose to dance from Grutter’s firm holding that diversity is an
interest supporting compelling necessity.”220 Like Citizens United, Grutter
thus appears to accomplish two things: it established a rule of law and
settled a debatable factual question to bind the lower courts.
III. WHAT SORT OF AUTHORITATIVE FORCE SHOULD ATTACH
TO SUPREME COURT STATEMENTS OF FACT?
With some examples now in mind, we must tackle the question that
lurks behind any discussion of precedent: How should judges treat statements from the past in making decisions in the present? And specifically,
how much weight, if any, should lower courts give to prior Supreme Court
statements of fact?
First, an important clarification is in order. Fred Schauer has effectively
refined the concept of precedent to explain that there is a difference between precedent as a rule and precedent as valuable experience.221 The latter
type of precedent (although perhaps misnamed) is when one decisionmaker
is “[u]nwilling or unable to do as much thinking, looking, or testing as a
previous decisionmaker . . . . ‘If Cardozo decided this way who am I to
disagree?’”222 For that type of precedent, if we truly believe the first decision was incorrect, we will reject the value of the experience. By contrast, a
true rule of precedent is a “norm limiting the decisionmaker’s flexibility,”
which means that “the fact that something was decided before gives it
present value despite our current belief that the previous decision was
erroneous.”223

219 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). The U.S. Supreme Court was presented with much of this research
in the Fisher litigation. See, e.g., Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 13, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345) (“The diversity rationale adopted
by the Grutter Court was created out of social science-backed whole cloth; it was dubious then, and
has not withstood the test of time. In particular, the rationale and evidence underlying the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body have been significantly undercut since
the Court’s decision.”); Brief for Gail Heriot et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8,
Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345).
220 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S. Ct.
2411.
221 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575 (1987).
222 Id.
223 Id.
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This distinction is critical to bear in mind when confronting factual
precedents. Unless a court tells us (which it often does not), it is impossible
to know what weight a judge gives to a Supreme Court statement of fact.
Even if, as in all of the examples discussed in Part II, the judge uses the
Court’s old factual claim to answer a dispositive question before it, we still
do not know whether she felt bound to do so, or merely did so because the
words were easy to find and had a special, prestigious U.S. Reports citation
attached to them.
At the end of the day, however, this uncertainty should not detract from
the normative concerns one has about factual precedents. We know that
lower courts rely on Supreme Court facts as authority because they cite to
these facts to explain how they reached important aspects of their decisions.
And that citation to authority matters in and of itself.
Law is, after all, “an authoritative practice”: what matters is not just the
reason, but also from where it comes.224 “[T]he fabric of law,” as Abbe Gluck
explains, is formed through judicial opinions.225 Thus, she states, methodology within those opinions matters, “[e]ven if one cannot prove that methodology dictates outcomes.”226
The reasons a court gives for its decision and what it cites to support
those reasons matter to litigants (particularly if their arguments are refuted
by such authorities).227 Those authorities also matter to future litigants who
present the same issue later. Whether a judge felt bound by a factual
authority that he cites, future lawyers and future judges know not and care
not. That authority becomes part of the legal decision, with explanatory
power now and persuasive power later. In the words of Fred Schauer, “[T]o
say ‘x because of y’ is not only to say x, but to say y as well.”228 There are
consequences, in other words, and commitments that attach when a legal
decisionmaker gives reasons for her decision.229 To fret about authorities,
224 Schauer, supra note 1, at 1934 (noting that in law, more so than in other disciplines, there
is a reliance on the source rather than the content of arguments and ideas); see also JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 5 (1st ed. 1979).
225 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1855 (2010).
226 Id. at 1768.
227 See Merryman, supra note 197 (“Presumably a citation means something to the person
citing, and presumably he anticipates that it will have some meaning to a reader.”); Schauer, supra
note 1, at 1934 (finding a focus on authority to be behind the renewed attention to citations in
court opinions); see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633-34 (1995)
(concluding that the practice of providing reasons for decisions is considered an essential aspect of
legal culture).
228 Schauer, supra note 227, at 642 (italics added).
229 Id.
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therefore, even if they are not binding on the decisionmaker, is to worry
about the very backbone of the legal process itself.230
This next Part addresses what sort of authoritative force Supreme Court
facts should carry. Two potential weights are considered: factual statements
could be binding on lower courts, or they could be especially persuasive by
virtue of having been decided by the Justices. I reject both possibilities and
argue against recognizing factual precedents at all. In short, generalized
factual claims from the Supreme Court should not receive any precedential
value separate and apart from the legal rules they helped to create.
A. Binding Authority: A Stare Decisis of Fact?
One possibility is that factual claims adopted and approved by the Supreme
Court should bind lower courts faced with those same factual questions
later—a “factual stare decisis” if you will.231 To my knowledge, no scholar
has argued that a factual precedent should bind lower courts in any formal
sense,232 but it appears some lower courts are treating Supreme Court
factual claims in precisely this manner, even if they are doing so in an
unthinking and undefended way. It is a useful exercise, therefore, to consider
the possibility of a factual stare decisis and then to identify precisely what
problems it creates.
The argument for factual stare decisis, an argument that would approve
all of the factual precedents discussed above, would be about efficiency and
institutional competence. The Supreme Court is better equipped than lower
courts to handle questions of fact—such as social science data on juvenile
brain development—because the Justices hear fewer cases than any other
court and thus have the luxury of time and the benefit of extensive briefing
by experts, often as amici. If we want better judicial decisionmaking on
tough empirical questions of fact, the argument goes, then we should assign
the responsibility to the judges with the time and resources to evaluate
multiple studies, look into methodological strengths and weaknesses across
them, and evaluate their credibility. Given these institutional advantages, at
least relative to other courts,233 the Supreme Court is the best judicial
institution to settle generalized questions of fact that affect litigation.
230 See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1960 (“If law is an authoritative practice, then a great deal
turns on what the authorities are.”)
231 See Gorod, supra note 11, at 63.
232 See Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1190-91 (arguing the reverse: that a reviewing court should
defer to the trial court’s findings of social facts).
233 The question of the Court’s factfinding competence as compared to that of legislative
bodies is a separate question that many have debated before. See, e.g., Devins, supra note 36, at
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Benefits of this approach are similar to the benefits of stare decisis generally: uniformity, efficiency, and predictability.234 Most of these justifications for stare decisis, both vertical (the obligation of lower courts to follow
rules of higher courts) and horizontal (the obligation of one court to follow
its own precedent), share the common goal of furthering the rule of law.235
Scholars debate whether a strong conception of stare decisis is worth it:
What good is predictable uniform law if it is wrong?236 Without wading into
those waters, however, note that virtually everybody believes that legal
precedents subject to stare decisis are made carefully: they are powerfully
argued, slowly deliberated, and meticulously justified by multiple people.
Even if one thinks a legal rule handed down by the Supreme Court is
wrong, one can at least be assured that it was the product of much process
and deliberate thought. This careful deliberation alone buttresses the rule of
law, which, Fred Schauer explains, makes us “feel better.”237

1180 (comparing Congress’s ability to “gather and assess information” with the manner in which
courts are “shackled by the temporal and reactive nature of litigation”). It is a debate, however,
that I do not enter today.
234 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE L.J.
1999, 2024 (2011) (“When the Court considers the work of past Courts, the key concept is stare
decisis while the key attitude recognizes the importance of reliance.”); Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus
Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843, 1855-57 (2013)
(cataloguing common justifications for precedent and arguing that views on stare decisis must be
integrated with a broader interpretive philosophy); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External
Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 93-94 (1989) (arguing that stare
decisis is efficient because it minimizes error and judicial review costs, maximizes the public good
aspect of judicial decisionmaking, and increases societal demand for judge-made rules).
235 Indeed, this phrase is commonly used by the Supreme Court when discussing stare decisis. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 378 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that
“the greatest purpose [of stare decisis] is to serve a constitutional ideal—the rule of law”); Welch
v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1987) (“The rule of law
depends in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. Indeed, the doctrine is ‘a natural
evolution from the very nature of our institutions.’” (citation omitted)). But see Jeremy Waldron,
Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach 34-35 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Public Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-75, 2011), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/abstract_id=1942557 (“I do not endorse the position . . . that ‘[t]he rule of law depends
in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis.’ But it might be true the other way
around: the justification of stare decisis might depend to a large extent on the rule of law.”
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
236 See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1,
3-4 (2001) (developing a theory of stare decisis based on the principle that there is no harm in
dispelling the presumption against overruling manifestly erroneous decisions).
237 See Schauer, supra note 221, at 598 (“Much of what we value about predictability is psychological. I feel better knowing that the letter carrier will come at the same time every day, that
faculty meetings will not be scheduled on short notice, and that April brings the opening of the
baseball season. Predictability thus often has value even when we cannot quantify it.”).
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Factual precedents cannot claim the same thing. They may not be the
product of careful deliberation. Facts—at least the type of generalized facts
about the world I am concerned with—are often marshaled by Supreme
Court Justices to build arguments and to tell a “story.”238 This has several
implications. For one thing, it means that factual authorities are selected for
a reason distinct from how likely they are to be accurate. As one judge
candidly explained, a judge “picks her rhetoric to foreshadow the result.”239
And she picks her factual claims the same way. “Motivated reasoning” and
“confirmation bias” are terms psychologists use to describe this phenomenon—we look for sources to support what we already think we know.240
A consequence is that there is less trust that the authorities are correct,
particularly for factual questions that are controversial and the subject of
easily accessible data from sources with highly variable reliability. Supreme
Court factfinding has changed since the dawn of the digital revolution. As I
have observed elsewhere, Supreme Court Justices, like the rest of us, are
now surrounded by factual information literally at their fingertips.241 They
no longer need to rely predominately on the adversarial system to supply
evidence on factual questions; they can just Google for data, empirical
studies, claims in secondary sources, and newspaper accounts. Of course,
some information on the Internet is reliable, but some of it is not. And the
tremendous increase of data available to research means there is almost
always evidence to support a preexisting view regardless of its reliability.242
To the extent Justices are researching factual questions on their own, the
resulting claims can suffer from unrealized bias or be just plainly incorrect.243
238 See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1386 (1995) (“When an appellate judge sits down to write up a case, she
knows how the case will come out and she consciously relates a ‘story’ that will convince the reader
it has come out right.”).
239 Id. at 1377.
240 See Stuart Ford, A Social Psychology Model of the Perceived Legitimacy of International Criminal Courts: Implications for the Success of Transitional Justice Mechanisms, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
405, 434 (2012) (“Confirmation bias refers to the tendency for people to search for, interpret, and
remember information in a way that systematically impedes their ability to reject a preexisting
hypothesis. In other words, under certain circumstances people tend to search for, recall, and
interpret information in a way that has a tendency to confirm their existing beliefs.” (footnotes
omitted)); id. at 420-21 (“The central tenet of motivated reasoning is that ‘[p]eople are more likely
to arrive at those conclusions that they want to arrive at.’” (alternation in original)).
241 See Larsen, supra note 7, at 1260-61.
242 See Berring, supra note 83, at 1690.
243 See id. (“For the modern Supreme Court there is no final primary authority, only a kaleidoscope of sources that one can shift to provide any of a number of pictures.”). As others have
noted, and as I hope to explore in future work, the risk of bias and unreliability can come from
within the adversary process as well, particularly in light of the recent rise in Supreme Court
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Exacerbating this situation, factual authorities cited in a Supreme Court
opinion are very likely selected solely by the Justice writing the opinion to
make his case to his colleagues. While we can be sure that a legal holding
that garners five votes at the Court is debated by all of the Justices, the same
assumption cannot be made about the factual claims that pepper the footnotes. Most of the time, presumably, facts mounted to frame an argument
are not discussed at conference; they are added later by the opinion writer
at the time the opinion is written. While it is fair to assume all Justices who
sign on to an opinion have read the factual claims it contains, we cannot
have the same confidence that the Justices have critically examined every
factual source cited in the footnotes given the time constraints of litigation.244 Particularly for factual claims that are not central to the dispute, it
seems unlikely that a source selected for its rhetorical appeal will be subject
to careful scrutiny by all of the Justices who sign on to the opinion.
Another reason to fret about a practice of binding factual precedents is
that our understanding of the world changes over time. A fact considered
true in 1955 may seem laughable in 2015. Take, for example, the seemingly
progressive factual claim, made famous in the Brandeis brief relied on in
Muller v. Oregon in 1908, that long working hours jeopardize the “general
welfare, health and morals” of women.245 It is too easy with the benefit of
hindsight to criticize the Supreme Court for relying on this social science
which has since been widely refuted.246 It is impossible and unfair to task
the Justices with the responsibility of seeing into the future on factual
claims. But the reality is that facts are fickle, and it is unwise to entrench
them into the law when tomorrow’s science can reveal their flaws.
At bottom, my concerns with factual precedents are similar to the concerns others have expressed about conflating the line between dicta and
holdings.247 Generally speaking, a dictum is an assertion in a court opinion
that is superfluous to the decision. Although identifying this line is sometimes

amicus briefs. See Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1216-18 (arguing that amicus briefs are often written
as part of a “deliberate campaign” by interest groups and are not a good source for unbiased
factfinding).
244 Cf. Wald, supra note 238, at 1374 (“Time does not allow for the same careful, thoughtful
analysis and writing to be poured into all cases.”).
245 208 U.S. 412, 414 (1908).
246 See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Science: Selective
Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 106 (1993) (“Brandeis’s brief would be assessed
harshly as junk social science by today’s standards.”).
247 By making this analogy, I do not mean to imply that facts are always dicta in Supreme
Court opinions. To be sure, sometimes a factual finding can be critical to a legal holding.
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challenging,248 the basic notion is that if the judgment would be unaffected
by the proposition in question, then the proposition is just dicta.249
As Judge Pierre Leval remarked several years ago, however, “The distinction between dictum and holding is more and more frequently disregarded.”250 Although, he explained, “most agree in the abstract with the
proposition that dictum does not establish binding law, this rule is now
honored in the breach with alarming frequency.”251 This temptation is even
greater when the dictum comes from the U.S. Supreme Court. Many lower
courts have explicitly stated that Supreme Court dictum is different, and
that statements by the Supreme Court, even in dicta, should not be idly
ignored and are more than just “casual suggestion[s].”252
Why the alarm for the erosion of this dicta line? Judge Leval worries
that treating dicta as binding makes judges “more likely to exercise flawed,
ill-considered judgment[s], more likely to overlook salutary cautions and
contraindications, [and] more likely to pronounce flawed rules.”253 When a
court comments on issues outside the scope of the judgment, in many
instances, it does so “with no briefing whatsoever on the issue” and, as
Judge Leval speculates, with “insufficient judicial scrutiny.”254
His fear is not new. Michael Dorf has explained that jurists dating back
at least to Chief Justice Marshall have provided two dominant reasons for
disregarding dicta: (1) a fear that dicta are less carefully considered than
holdings and therefore less likely to be accurate, and (2) an Article III

248 I do not mean to undersell the confusion in the courts about how to distinguish holdings
from dicta. As others have documented, this confusion is significant and pervasive. See Michael C.
Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2003 (1994) (“No universal agreement exists as
to how to measure the scope of judicial holdings.”).
249 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953,
1056 (2005) (offering a definition of dicta).
250 Leval, supra note 103, at 1250. See also David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory
Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2041 (2013) (arguing
that the dictum–holding distinction plays a significant role in fewer than 1 in every 2000 federal
district court cases).
251 Leval, supra note 103, at 1250.
252 See United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1167 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (“Most federal
circuits have recognized that ‘by the way’ statements made by the Supreme Court resonate more
forcefully than dicta from other sources.”); id. (“It would be disingenuous” to say that statements
made by the Supreme Court in dicta “amount[] to no more than a casual suggestion.”); see also
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d
Cir. 2003) (“[W]e should not idly ignore considered statements the Supreme Court makes in
dicta.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
253 Leval, supra note 103, at 1255.
254 Id. at 1262-63.
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concern that courts have “legitimate authority only to decide cases, not to
make law in the abstract.”255
Both concerns about dicta hold equally true for allocating precedential
force to generalized factual claims. Factual authorities are less likely to be
scrutinized than are their legal counterparts and are not always central to
the question presented. Thus, for the risks about accuracy it creates and the
legitimacy concerns it exacerbates, factual stare decisis is unwise; a lower
court should ordinarily not feel bound by a Supreme Court factual claim.
B. Persuasive Authority: Skidmore Deference to the
Supreme Court as Factfinder?
A second possibility is to consider Supreme Court factual statements as
only persuasive authority. Persuasive authority is the phrase generally given
to an authority that is not binding on a court but which “depends for its
influence upon its own merits.”256 This type of authoritative force could take
two forms.
One option is that a trial judge cites a historical source or a psychological study because he read it and was persuaded by it. Perhaps that study was
brought to his attention by a Supreme Court opinion, but the U.S. Reports
are just a convenient place to research. This use of an authority does not
involve deference at all; the factual authority is only persuasive to the extent
it has the power to persuade on its own.
This is not, however, an accurate description of the way lower courts cite
Supreme Court factual claims. In the cases described in Part II above, the
courts cite the actual Supreme Court language in the U.S. Reports without
always including the original factual source. It must matter to these lower
courts that the Justices used the authority once before—the Supreme Court
citation gives the source an extra bump of persuasive power supplemental to
the power it contains independently.257
This is more than just the power to persuade. One way to think about
this is to consider the Supreme Court as a default factfinder that offers a
presumptive, but rebuttable, answer to factual questions. For administrative

255
256

Dorf, supra note 248, at 2001.
Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It and When
Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 632 (1990).
257 Once a factual authority is cited in the U.S. Reports, the source automatically becomes
more prestigious. As John Merryman observed over sixty years, ago this has “an unavoidable effect
on future decisions. As a work increases in stature it becomes more authoritative—more capable of
influencing the actual consideration of cases by judges.” Merryman, supra note 197, at 619.
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law types, this is Skidmore258 deference, which lies “somewhere between the
poles of independent judgment and controlling deference.”259 On this view,
a lower court judge does more than apply her own judgment about the
merits of the factual source; she defers to the first decisionmaker (here, the
Supreme Court) because there are contextual reasons surrounding the first
decision that justify the deference. Just as an agency’s expertise deserves
some deference, Supreme Court factual findings, the argument goes, should
generate the same respect.260
Put differently, because lower courts are overburdened and underfunded, it may make sense to offer them a shortcut through Supreme Court
factfinding. That shortcut is desirable, however, only if the Supreme Court
is competent to be an authority on the factual claims it makes. And there
are significant reasons to doubt that conclusion.
By way of illustration, for almost every factual claim discussed in Part II
above, there is some countervailing authority that could have been selected
to make the opposite point. Recall Justice O’Connor’s assertion in Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams that carpal tunnel typically heals on its own
without surgery. Indeed, she found legitimate authority to support this
claim; but a click of the mouse reveals a range of authorities to support the
opposite proposition.261 Likewise, Justice Ginsburg’s assertion in her
258
259

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1241 (2007); see also Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing
Skidmore within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1127 (2001) (discussing
the Supreme Court’s use of Skidmore deference in a case in which the Court “summarily dismisses
any notion of deference for the agency . . . [and] refers to its own independent reading of the
statute”).
260 There are competing conceptions of Skidmore and what it precisely means when a lower
court reviews agency decisionmaking. Compare Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 564 (1985), with Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead
Doctrine, 54 ADMIN L. REV. 807, 812 (2002). Some say Skidmore deference is nothing more than
independent judgment. Others say it involves more than independent judgment and embodies
some sort of actual deference to the first decisionmaker, although less than would be given under
Chevron. For purposes of this Article, I adopt the second conception of Skidmore, which seems to
be the one that dominates in the lower courts. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 259, at 1281
(describing how courts of appeals “overwhelmingly” use the standards-based approach of Skidmore
deference).
261 See Joshua Tucker, When Will That Carpal Tunnel Go Away? The Correct Questions Is, Will
It Ever Go Away?, EZINE @RTICLES, http://ezinearticles.com/?When-Will-That-Carpal-TunnelGo-Away?—The-Correct-Questions-Is,-Will-it-Ever-Go-Away?&id=2187115 (last visited Oct. 25,
2013) (“Carpal Tunnel won’t just go away. It’s not an injury that needs to ‘heal’. Waiting it out is a
losing strategy.”); Dr. Younai, Preventing Carpal Tunnel, ARTICLESBASE (Dec. 14, 2010), http://
www.articlesbase.com/alternative-medicine-articles/preventing-carpal-tunnel-3842709.html (“[The]
fact is carpal tunnel does not go away on its own[.] [I]nstead the signs and symptoms are
persistent and need to be treated immediately because carpal tunnel is [a] progressive disease.”).
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Carhart dissent that reports of postabortion depression are exaggerated is
supported by a string cite to articles in many reputable journals.262 But
someone attempting to prove the opposite point could easily construct her
own long string cite including articles that, to the untrained eye, appear
reputable and purport to be peer-reviewed and the result of long-term
studies.263
And giving credence to the line that “history is [an] argument without
end,”264 the Supreme Court’s ventures into history are likewise subject to
challenge by countervailing factual authorities. For example, the Court’s
factual account of the history of the Second Amendment and the founding
generation’s attitudes towards guns in District of Columbia v. Heller265 could
have been radically different depending on the one recounting the tale.266

262
263

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S 124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Jesse R. Cougle et al., Depression Associated with Abortion and Childbirth: A Longterm Analysis of the NLSY Cohort, 9 MED. SCI. MONIT. CR157, CR162 (2003), available at
http://www.vozvictimas.org/pdf/documentos/cougle2003.pdf (“At an average of eight years after
their first pregnancy, women who aborted their first pregnancy have significantly higher likelihood
of being at risk for clinical depression than childbearing women who do not report a history of
abortion.”); Jonathan Gornall, Where Do We Draw the Line, 334 BMJ 285, 288 (2007) (discussing a
study by David Fergusson and his colleagues that tracked 500 women up to age 25 and found that
“those who had had abortions had higher rates of depression, suicidal behavior, and other mental
problems that could not be explained by conditions that existed before the pregnancy” (citing
David M. Fergusson et al., Abortion in Young Women and Subsequent Mental Health, 47 J. CHILD
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 16 (2006))); Steve Ertelt, Recent Studies Confirm Women Face Depression
After Abortion, Other Problems, LIFENEWS.COM (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.lifenews.
com/2010/09/28/nat-6733 (“An August study published in the Journal of Pregnancy and involving
374 women who had abortions—more than five times the number of women who appeared in the
new study—found women having high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms
for women having both early and late abortions.”).
264 This common saying is generally attributed to Pieter Geyl. See, e.g., Jeffrey Kimball, The
Influence of Ideology on Interpretive Disagreement: A Report on a Survey of Diplomatic, Military and
Peace Historians on the Causes of 20th Century U.S. Wars, 17 HIST. TEACHER 355, 355 (1984)
(quoting Geyl).
265 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
266 Historians have challenged the accuracy of the account in Heller which grounds the Second Amendment in the founding generation’s alleged desire to bear arms for personal selfdefense. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV.
145, 171 (2008) (questioning the history of the Second Amendment as recounted in Heller); Akhil
R. Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L. REV.
889, 904 (“[A]t the Founding, the Second [Amendment] was primarily a military amendment.”);
H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context: The Case of the
Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 433-34 (2000) (discussing how the Ratifiers
interpreted the Second Amendment in the context of “communal military units,” not in the
context of a private right to bear arms); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism:
Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 246-47 (2008) (“[T]here is a radically different
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The point here is not a “gotcha” one; for purposes of this Article it does
not matter to me which side of these factual debates has it right. The point
instead is that today’s digital world makes it very easy to find factual
authorities—even authorities making completely opposite claims—and
discerning which one is right (particularly outside one’s area of expertise) is
no easy task.
There is no good reason, therefore, to trust that one Justice one afternoon has stumbled upon the accurate side of a factual debate while trying to
convince his colleagues of a legal position. If the authorities she cites are
persuasive to a lower court, then they are persuasive to a lower court. But
no supplemental authoritative force—no extra persuasive bump—should
attach to the factual sources because they appeared in the U.S. Reports.
The analogy to Skidmore deference is therefore quite helpful. The level
of deference due to an agency under Skidmore depends on certain contextual
circumstances: “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality,
and relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”267
Very few of those factors apply to the Supreme Court’s assertions of
legislative facts. As described above, the Court’s factual statements—the
ones that are then used by lower courts as authorities later—are often found
off the record, sometimes without the vote of five Justices, and without
assurance that the factual authorities were deliberated or carefully inspected. Indeed it is also quite possible that the factual source was discovered by
the author of a Supreme Court opinion, not in a search for a truth, but
instead to make a rhetorical argument more persuasive.268 Applying a
Skidmore-type deference to Supreme Court factfinding, therefore, is inappropriate because the contextual circumstances surrounding the factfinding
do not merit the extra deference.
What, then, should a trial judge do with a new case and a new factual
record when faced with an on-point statement of generalized fact from the
nation’s highest court? The best choice, I think, is to ignore it. Of course,
the U.S. Reports are fair game to research, and if a factual authority
reading of Heller. The constitutional text is ambiguous, and many historians believe that the
Second Amendment does not, in fact, create a right to use guns for nonmilitary purposes.”).
267 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (footnotes omitted) (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)). For a helpful analysis of Skidmore deference as
it has evolved, see Hickman & Krueger, supra note 259, at 1258.
268 See Borgmann, supra note 11, at 1190 (asserting that “appellate courts’ ‘factfinding’ is often
less a search for the truth than for good rhetorical sound bites to support a court’s favored
outcome”).
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unearthed by a Justice is persuasive to the lower court judge at face value,
then certainly he should feel free to rely on it. But the influence that
authority has on the judge should not depend on the fact that it once
appeared in an opinion authored by a Supreme Court Justice. The default
rule, in other words, should be to give no authoritative force to Supreme
Court statements of fact.
This rule would assuage the concerns outlined above: the risk that a factual claim is selected by the Justices for reasons other than that it is the
most accurate source among a sea of sources; the distinct possibility that the
fact will change over time; the legitimacy concern (tied up with the nature
of dicta) that the factual claim may not be properly before the Court and is
therefore beyond its authority to decide; and, even putting aside those
worries, the likelihood that a lower court will take the factual claim out of
context.
IV. WHAT TO DO WITH “PREMISE FACTS”?
Assuming I have built a convincing case against most types of factual
precedents, one difficult puzzle persists to which I offer some preliminary
thoughts. As described above, there are times where the Supreme Court’s
legal pronouncement depends quite explicitly on a factual claim—a factual
premise to the legal decision. When the Court makes one of those claims,
like in Citizens United or Grutter, it seems to be authoritatively answering a
factual question for the nation. In these cases the risk is not that lower
courts will take the Supreme Court’s language out of context; instead, we
are confronting a factual precedent that seems purposely set.
What should lower courts do when parties come to court with new evidence that challenges one of those factual claims? If those factual claims are
off limits, then we have condoned at least one type of factual precedent,
even if it seems odd for nine Justices to be the final arbiter of a fact. If the
answer, however, is that those factual claims are up for debate in any lower
court in subsequent litigation, then we run the risk of chaos or at least a
serious weak spot in the Supreme Court’s authority.
Consider the recent exchange between the U.S. Supreme Court and the
Montana Supreme Court over the potentially corrupting nature of corporate
campaign expenditures.269 Recall that Justice Kennedy found no reliable
evidence (on either the record before him or on Supreme Court records
269 See supra Section II.E for a discussion of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and
Western Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. Attorney General, 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011).
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previously built on the subject) that independent corporate campaign
expenditures corrupt the political process.270 Undeterred, the Montana
litigants built a new record and successfully argued the opposite factual
claim to the highest court in their state; the Montana Supreme Court
upheld Montana’s campaign finance law because the case before it had
“different facts” from those in Citizens United.271
What lessons do we draw from the quick summary reversal handed
down by the U.S Supreme Court six months later?272 In a two paragraph per
curiam opinion, the Court explained “there [could] be no serious doubt”
that Citizens United applied to the Montana law.273 Four Justices dissented
from the per curiam opinion, but even they seemed to admit that the new
factual record did not relieve Montana from the force of the precedent;
their plea, instead, was to reconsider Citizens United itself.274
One possible explanation of this sequence of events is that the Citizens
United majority believed it was settling—nationally—the factual question of
whether independent corporate expenditures corrupt politics. On this view,
five Justices created a factual precedent, and the Montana challenge to that
precedent got the back of the Court’s hand. Tabling the difficult question
about whether the Supreme Court has the power to conclusively answer
factual questions about the world and command that its answer bind all
other courts, allow me to offer a different explanation for the Montana
summary reversal.
Perhaps the “factual finding” in Citizens United about corporate election
expenditures was not actually a finding of fact but, instead, was just part of
the Court’s legal rule. To be sure, the Court talks like it is making a factual
finding. Justice Kennedy, remember, scanned the “records” and discovered
“scant evidence” of political corruption.275 But although this sounds like an
empirical or quasi-empirical finding, I submit that with premise facts like
these the Court is not really finding facts but is rather building bright line
rules. Rather than embracing, for example, a standard that corporate
election expenditures are protected by the First Amendment when it is

270
271
272
273
274

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.
W. Tradition P’ship, 271 P.3d at 6.
Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam).
Id. at 2491-92.
See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Montana’s experience, like considerable experience elsewhere since the Court’s decision in Citizens United, casts grave doubt on the Court’s supposition
that independent expenditures do not corrupt or appear to do so. Were the matter up to me, I
would vote to grant the petition for certiorari in order to reconsider Citizens United or, at least, its
application in this case.”).
275 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.

110

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 59

reasonably doubtful they will corrupt, the Court instead adopted a rule that
corporate election spending is protected because it generally does not cause
corruption.
The Court’s rule was fueled by a factual understanding of the world—a
generalization about politics and money. Surely, that understanding is not
always accurate, as was apparently the case in Montana. But this overinclusive nature is the very essence of the distinction between a rule and a
standard. When reading Citizens United, it sounds like the Court is establishing a fact (corporate money does not create corruption) and reasoning a
rule from it (therefore the First Amendment protects it). I think, however,
that the Court is working in the other direction—choosing a rule over a
standard and expressing the generalized factual observations that led it to
make that choice.
This would not be extraordinary because the Supreme Court frequently
embeds factual generalizations in legal rules. In Gonzales v. Carhart, for
example, the Supreme Court considered the factual question of whether a
particular method of partial-birth abortion was ever medically necessary.276
Under my definition, this is a question of fact: it can be refuted and is
supported by testable evidence. But it would be odd for the Court to
provide an authoritative answer to this question as a pure factual matter.
Would any doctor who testified otherwise be wrong because five Justices of
the Supreme Court said so?
Instead of viewing the Court as factfinder on this question, a closer look
at Carhart reveals something more complex. The Carhart Court created a
legal rule granting government discretion to legislate within the medical
uncertainty of whether partial-birth abortions are ever necessary to preserve
the health of the mother.277 This answer entangles law and fact; it melds the
two together to form a legal rule.
We thus find ourselves back where this project began with the tricky
endeavor of distinguishing factual questions from legal ones. Perhaps the
best way to understand the precedential value of “premise facts,” therefore,
is to recognize that with premise facts we have left the land of facts altogether. These “facts” have precedential value because they are not facts, but
rather part of a legal rule.
The Montana litigation following Citizens United is best understood this
way: by reversing the Montana Court, the Supreme Court was flexing its
276
277

550 U.S. 124, 165-66 (2007).
See id. at 163 (“The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific uncertainty.”).
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muscles as the final authority on the dispute. It was not, however, using its
authoritative muscles to settle the empirical dispute about the effect of
corporate money on elections. Citizens United is binding on Montana not
because the Court settled the factual question about election practices for
everyone; it is precedent because it is part of a legal rule that, by its nature,
is overinclusive.
Grutter v. Bollinger can be read the same way.278 One way to understand
Grutter is to read Justice O’Connor’s opinion as finding, as a factual matter,
that a racially diverse class enriches a law school education and benefits
society as a whole. Indeed, the part of the opinion making this point sounds
like a factual recitation: she cites data-rich empirical studies and states that
“[t]hese benefits are not theoretical but real.”279 Should lower courts quickly
dismiss studies on the other side of this debate because the Supreme Court
made a conclusive factual claim that went the other way?
I do not think that is the best way to understand Grutter’s mandate. Like
Citizens United, Grutter used factual claims to form a legal rule: the data
indicating the benefits of a racially diverse class justifies deference to
university officials as a matter of law.280 On this read, just like in Citizens
United, the legislative fact is embedded in the legal rule; the precedential
effect stems from the legal component of the decision, not the factual one.
So what happens to our lower court judge who must decide whether to
hear evidence on a factual question the Supreme Court has purported to
answer? How does he know whether to hold a hearing on the benefits of a
racially diverse class or to consider the issue resolved by fiat due to its
intrinsic relationship to a legal rule?
To solve this problem, I propose a clear statement rule.281 If the Supreme Court is clear that its factual statements are part of a legal rule, then
the statements are authoritative due to their legal component. Absent such a

278
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539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Id. at 330.
See id. (“In addition to the expert studies and reports entered into evidence at trial, numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes learning . . . .”).
281 A clear statement rule tells courts they should not read a statute in a way that will have
certain consequences unless Congress has been clear it intended those consequences to ensue. See
generally David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 921,
946 (1992) (“The tendency of courts to require clear legislative articulation of changes in private
liberty or property interests is not without its critics . . . .”); John F. Manning, Clear Statement
Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 407-08 (2010); Thomas B. Bennett, Note, The
Canon at the Water’s Edge, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 210 (2012). A clear statement rule about factual
precedents would similarly instruct courts to limit their reliance on Supreme Court factual claims,
unless the Court is specific about the mixed legal–factual component of such statements.
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clear label, a lower court should assume that the factual dispute is open for
debate.
Consider the following example of how a clear statement rule could operate.
In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court considered whether the police
could search the passenger compartment of a car as incident to the driver’s
arrest.282 The Court noted as a factual matter—or as the dissent called it, a
“fiction”—that, most of the time, items in the passenger side of a car are
within arm’s reach of the arrestee.283 It admitted this observation was a
“generalization” but stressed the need for the categorical approach in order
to produce a result that was “workable.”284 The Court thus explicitly made
its factual observation a critical part of a bright line rule.
Subsequent to Belton, many defendants brought challenges to the rule on
the basis that the factual claim it embraced—that most passenger compartments of a car are within the driver’s reach—was simply not true in their
specific cases.285 Indeed, the frequency of the challenges and the size of the
“chorus” that had called for the Court to reconsider Belton ultimately
prevailed.286 In 2009, in Arizona v. Gant, the Court disavowed the “broad”
reading of Belton—the one that had been embraced by the lower courts and
widely taught in police academies.287 Instead, it announced a rule of reason
so that the facts of each specific case would determine whether articles
inside a car are in fact within arm’s reach of the arrestee.288
What does Belton teach us about factual precedents? In Belton, the Court
used a legislative fact (a generalized observation about car design) to set a
legal rule. Challenges to that fact were largely unsuccessful until the Court
changed course, but not because the Court had set a factual precedent.
When a majority of the Court either no longer believed in the factual
premise or thought the rule stemming from the factual claim was unwise, it
changed its mind by abandoning the legal rule and instead adopting a
standard.
One can criticize Belton as an inappropriate context for a rule over a
standard, but, regardless, I applaud the Court for the candor it used about
282
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284
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453 U.S. 454, 455-57 (1981).
Id. at 460.
Id.
For a discussion of the lower court decisions on this issue, see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 342-43 (2009).
286 Id. at 338.
287 Id. at 347.
288 See id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if
the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or
it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”).
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the role facts played in the opinion. Helpfully for lower courts faced with
interpreting Belton, the Court was precise that its factual observation was a
“generalization,” producing a “workable rule.”289 Love it or hate it, the
Belton rule was precedential as a rule of law—one implanted with factual
claims for sure but a rule of law nonetheless. Without such a clear statement, courts cannot know whether they should independently examine
whether passenger compartments are within a driver’s reach. I propose that
absent a clear statement from the Supreme Court announcing a rule
informed by a factual generalization, a lower court should assume it is not
bound by the Court’s factual statement.
Adopting this interpretive rule would produce several positive results.
First, it would presumably limit the creation of factual precedents. To the
extent a lower court judge is confused about the authoritative force attached
to Supreme Court factual claims, the interpretive rule would provide
guidance: when in doubt, assume you are not bound. This result is beneficial
because of the risks associated with the unfettered practice of citing the
Court on factual claims. In addition, it provides clarity to judges who are
unsure whether the factual question remains open.
Granted, my proposed clear statement rule cannot prevent judges who
want to cite to the Court’s facts for calculated reasons—indeed, there is
little that can be done about. But, an additional benefit of the clear statement rule lies in its signaling power. Like other clear statement rules, this
one would be fueled by normative concerns: a nervousness about relying on
authorities (the Justices) who are not authoritative on the subject at hand.
Presumably, a jurisdiction that adopted this interpretive rule would send a
message that factual precedents are disfavored. Thus, in theory at least,
there would be a decrease in the use of factual precedents out of context by
lower courts seeking to value Supreme Court factual claims beyond their
actual worth.
Second, putting aside its effect on lower courts, an interpretive rule
could serve to encourage candor and precision on the Supreme Court itself
with respect to facts. Currently, the Court finds facts unabashedly and often
cavalierly. As in Citizens United, it is very difficult to tell from reading its
opinions when the Court is finding a fact and when the Court is articulating
a legal rule. Exacerbating the already challenging task of distinguishing fact
from law, the Court often speaks in “factfinding” phrases when it announces
rules—evaluating “evidence” on the record and supporting observations

289 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460. Of course, one can always fault the Court (and some have) for
not being precise enough.
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about the world with empirical data and published studies.290 It is easy to
understand why a lower court, like Montana, might think Citizens United
was a case “decided upon its facts or lack of facts.”291
My clear statement rule would provide an incentive for the Supreme
Court to be precise on the role facts play in its decisions. The Court would
be able to insulate its decision from future factual challenge only if it is clear
that the fact is blended with the legal rule. The surest way to make something unreviewable is for the Court to adopt a rule that makes factfinding
irrelevant: to hold, for example, that the Constitution is colorblind or that
there is no possible justification for banning corporate speech. But the
Justices need not go so far as to abandon all factual dimensions of their
analysis; they simply need to be clear about what role the facts are playing.
And, if they are not clear, then lower courts should assume the facts are not
part of a legal rule and consequently get no precedential effect.
There are risks to this approach, to be sure. It is possible that an erroneous factual premise will become enshrined with a legal rule and, consequently, entrenched nationwide. It is also possible that the Justices will be
tempted to obscure the role the fact plays and be less than candid when a
legal rule depends on a factual claim. What if, for example, the Court is
wrong on a premise fact like the one in Citizens United and, because it says it
is part of a legal rule, it becomes immune to challenge in other forums?
But this objection—although legitimate—already exists and will persist
to the extent facts have any role to play in Supreme Court doctrine. Moreover,
the response to this risk is one familiar to discussions of stare decisis: the
Court will have to wait and correct its course another day. Indeed, when the
Court revisits a precedent, it already considers changed understandings of
the facts.292 At least with a default rule against factual precedents, the
factual question is more often open to challenge in lower courts on new
records with new evidence. Litigation can form a valuable vehicle for the
Court to revisit its rule if the factual predicate changes over time.
290 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360-61 (2010) (stating there is only “scant
evidence” that independent corporate expenditures lead to political corruption); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (citing social science studies and other empirical evidence to
establish the substantial benefits “that diversity is designed to produce”). For a thoughtful
consideration of the role social science played in the Grutter opinion, see Heise, supra note 215, at
877-80, and Justin Pidot, Note, Intuition or Proof: The Social Science Justification for the Diversity
Rationale in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, 59 STAN. L. REV. 761, 804-06 (2006).
291 W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 6 (Mont. 2011).
292 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863 (1992) (discussing how the
Court had overturned its own precedent based on “an understanding of facts, changed from those
which furnished the claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions”).
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CONCLUSION
New technological changes in how we access information will inevitably
affect how judges use facts to explain their decisions. There is much to be
gained from firmly rooting judicial opinions in facts about the world. Our
challenge, however, as we embrace this useful new tool is to safeguard
against unintended sloppy results that can come from being surrounded by
infinite information. Limiting factual precedents is one such solution.
Lower courts should look to the Supreme Court for guidance on the law,
but they should not treat the Justices as experts on everything—particularly
on subjects on which they are not and do not claim to be the ultimate
authority.

